Peptide Research Literature Index
A structured, dated index of the research-peptide landscape

Is "the rules were unclear" a defense? Two executives argued it to a federal appeals court and lost, because the vagueness test written for a business is deliberately looser than the one written for a person — and the stated reason is that a company is assumed to have a lawyer

Reference page · published 2026-11-07

Disclosure: this index is operated by Artemis Labs, which sells research compounds to laboratories. That makes us an interested party here, and the interest runs against the conclusion below, so it belongs at the top: the argument this page reports on is the argument a seller in our position would most like to be able to make, and the documents do not support it. Nothing here is legal advice, nothing here predicts any outcome for anybody, and no product page is linked from this page. Every quotation below is verbatim from a federal appellate opinion, a Supreme Court opinion, a Supreme Court docket and order list, or an FDA memorandum — each one fetched from the court's or the agency's own server and read for this page on November 7, 2026, and each listed under Sources with the identifier you need to pull the same file. Two limits belong at the top as well. Every case discussed here is about a medical device or a drug, and none of them is about a research compound; and where a document says something that cuts against the point we are making, it is quoted saying it.

If you sell research compounds, or buy them, you have probably had this thought. The rules in this area are written in terms like intended use. What a product is intended for is decided from what you said, what you wrote, how you designed it, and the circumstances in which you shipped it. That is an enormous amount of territory, and the obvious objection is that nobody could know in advance where the line falls. Surely a rule that broad is itself unlawful.

That objection has a name in constitutional law. It is a vagueness claim under the Due Process Clause, and it has been made in this exact area, at length, by defendants with far more legal resources than a small seller has. It was decided three years ago, and the Supreme Court was asked to look at it and said no.

This page reads that decision from end to end, along with the Supreme Court case it takes its test from and the FDA document that now relies on it. The answer is more specific and more uncomfortable than a simple no.

The short version. (1) There are two vagueness tests, not one. Most criminal laws are measured against whether a person of ordinary intelligence has fair notice. Economic regulation is measured against whether a business person of ordinary intelligence would understand what is prohibited, which the First Circuit calls a less strict vagueness test. (2) The reason given for the looser test is about who you are, not what the rule says. The Supreme Court wrote in 1982 that economic regulation is subject to a less strict vagueness test because its subject matter is often more narrow, and because businesses, which face economic demands to plan behavior carefully, can be expected to consult relevant legislation in advance of action. (3) The stricter test is available when a law implicates speech — and the same court that said so had already held, earlier in the same opinion, that these offences do not. The two halves lock together. (4) FDA's written answer to the vagueness argument is much newer than the rule it defends. It is not in the 2021 intended-use rule and it is not in the January 2017 memorandum, where the string vagu appears 0 times in 63 pages. It is in a January 2025 Addendum filed into a 2016 rulemaking docket, and it is built on this 2023 decision.

What the case was, and who was arguing

The decision is United States v. Facteau, 89 F.4th 1, decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit on December 14, 2023. The opinion was written by Circuit Judge Lipez, sitting with Circuit Judges Gelpí and Thompson, on appeal from the District of Massachusetts.

The appellants were not a storefront. In the court's own description, they were former executives of the medical device manufacturer Acclarent, Inc., were found guilty of multiple misdemeanor violations of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act for distributing an adulterated and misbranded device. William Facteau had been Acclarent's chief executive; Patrick Fabian had been its vice president of sales. The product was a sinus device, the Relieva Stratus Microflow Spacer, cleared for one use, which the government said was sold for a different one.

Look at who filed briefs on their side. The Washington Legal Foundation. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America. The Chamber of Commerce of the United States. And a single brief filed jointly for Amgen, Biosplice Therapeutics, Boehringer Ingelheim, Bristol Myers Squibb, Eli Lilly and Company, GlaxoSmithKline, Novartis and Pfizer. Eight pharmaceutical companies, a trade association and the national chamber of commerce all told a federal appeals court that this body of law was constitutionally defective.

The court's answer to every argument is one sentence long: We reject all of these claims and affirm.

Facteau and Fabian asked the Supreme Court to take the case. The docket is No. 23-1016, captioned William Facteau and Patrick Fabian, Petitioners v. United States, Docketed: March 15, 2024, listing the lower court case numbers as Case Numbers: (21-1080, 21-1082). The last entry on that docket reads Oct 07 2024 Petition DENIED. We also pulled the Court's own order list for that day and found FACTEAU, WILLIAM, ET AL. V. UNITED STATES printed in its CERTIORARI DENIED section.

A denial of certiorari is not an endorsement of the reasoning below, and nobody should read it as one. What it does mean is practical: the First Circuit's decision stands, and there is no Supreme Court case taking the other side of it.

Two vagueness tests, and which one a business gets

Here is the part most summaries of this case leave out, and it is the part that matters most to anyone running a company.

The court states the general rule first, and it is the familiar one:

In most contexts, the test for unconstitutional vagueness is whether the challenged law is so indefinite that it “fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited.”

Then it immediately says that rule is not the one being applied:

For provisions that concern economic regulation, however, the test is whether a “business person of ordinary intelligence would understand” what conduct is prohibited — a less strict vagueness test.

Read those two sentences next to each other. The question is no longer whether the rule is clear enough for a person. It is whether the rule is clear enough for a business person, and the court says in the same breath that this is a less strict test.

That distinction is not the First Circuit's invention. It cites Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, at pages 499 and 501, decided by the Supreme Court in 1982. We fetched that opinion too, because a rule this consequential should be read where it was written, not where it was quoted.

The Supreme Court's own statement of it gives the reasoning, which the 2023 citation does not:

economic regulation is subject to a less strict vagueness test because its subject matter is often more narrow — a footnote number falls here in the original — and because businesses, which face economic demands to plan behavior carefully, can be expected to consult relevant legislation in advance of action.

Indeed, the regulated enterprise may have the ability to clarify the meaning of the regulation by its own inquiry, or by resort to an administrative process.

So the looser test is justified by an assumption about the regulated party. A business plans. A business reads the statute before it acts. A business can write to the agency and ask. None of those assumptions is about the words of the rule at all. They are about who is reading it.

The footnote that is about companies, not people

Attached to that passage in the 2023 opinion is footnote 20, and it is the single most load-bearing sentence on this page for a company in this category:

Courts are less likely to conclude that statutes and regulations “addressed to sophisticated businessmen and corporations” are unconstitutionally vague because of an assumption that, given the “complexity” of economic regulation, such parties “necessarily consult counsel in planning their activities,” and that some administrative process will often be available to secure advisory interpretations of the statute [or regulation] at issue.

The court is quoting its own earlier decision, United States v. Lachman, 387 F.3d 42, at page 57 (1st Cir. 2004). We did not fetch Lachman itself; the words above are quoted as the 2023 opinion prints them, and that limit is repeated under Sources.

Translate it into plain terms. The reason a company has a harder time arguing that a rule is too vague is an assumption that a company has a lawyer, and that if the lawyer is unsure the company can ask the agency. Whether a particular company actually has a lawyer on retainer is not part of the test. The assumption attaches to the category.

That is worth sitting with, because the intuition runs the opposite way. It feels as though a small operation facing a thicket of federal rules has the strongest fairness claim. Under this line of authority, the fairness claim is weaker for the business and stronger for the individual, and the stated ground is sophistication.

Why the speech answer decides the vagueness answer

Footnote 20 does not end there, and the second half is the mechanism that connects this page to the one next door in this index about whether FDA can use a truthful website as evidence.

The footnote goes on:

By contrast, vagueness review is more stringent when the challenged laws implicate the First Amendment's protections for speech.

So there is a route back to the stricter test. If the law in question burdens speech, the court looks harder at how clear it is. The opinion cites FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, at 253 to 254 (2012), for the point that a more rigorous vagueness inquiry is appropriate to ensure that ambiguity does not chill protected speech.

And then the footnote closes the route in one sentence:

As explained above, however, the adulteration and misbranding offenses underlying appellants' convictions do not raise First Amendment concerns.

That is the interlock, and it is stated by the court itself, not assembled by us. The First Amendment argument had already failed earlier in the same opinion. Because it failed, the stricter vagueness review was unavailable. Because the stricter review was unavailable, the looser business test applied. And the looser business test is the one justified by the assumption that the party has counsel.

The Supreme Court had set out the same relationship in 1982, from the other direction:

Finally, perhaps the most important factor affecting the clarity that the Constitution demands of a law is whether it threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.

If, for example, the law interferes with the right of free speech or of association, a more stringent vagueness test should apply.

For completeness, here is the speech holding that shut the door. On the general question the court wrote that we are in alignment with our sister circuits, and its statement of the rule is the one FDA later quoted in its own Addendum: courts to consider the issue have uniformly concluded that using speech merely as evidence of a misbranding offense under the [FD&C Act] does not raise First Amendment concerns. That is FDA's rendering of the sentence, brackets and all, and not our transcription of the opinion's own line, for a reason given in the method section below. On what the rule means for a seller choosing its words, the court was explicit:

It is of course true that medical device sellers, aware that their speech may become evidence of intended use , will necessarily choose their words carefully when promoting their products.

And it held that this careful word-choosing is not a constitutional burden. The reason it gives is that it is conduct and not speech that the law aims to control.

Note the stray space inside that quotation, before the comma. It is in the file the court publishes, not in our transcription, and the section on method below explains why we left it alone.

What the court actually decided about "intended use"

The appellants made two distinct arguments. The first was that the breadth of the evidence allowed to establish intended use is itself what makes the term vague. The regulation at issue for devices is 21 CFR 801.4, the device counterpart of the drug regulation at 21 CFR 201.128, and the government's reading of it was that intended use may be drawn from all the circumstances from any relevant source.

The court began by narrowing what a vagueness claim can be about:

The vagueness doctrine is primarily concerned with whether the language of a legal provision is sufficiently clear.

Then it looked at the language and found it clear enough:

Appellants fail to explain how, as a textual matter, the law lacked sufficient clarity to apprise them of when they would be criminally liable for distributing a device with an unapproved intended use.

It conceded the breadth openly, which is the sentence a careful reader should hold on to:

To be sure, the provision casts a wide net. It does so, however, in language that fairly apprises the reader of the broad range of conduct that may reasonably reflect a device's intended use.

Breadth is not the same thing as vagueness. That is the whole of the holding on this limb. A rule can sweep in a great deal of conduct and still tell you clearly that it sweeps in a great deal of conduct.

The court also rejected the idea that resting liability on intent makes a law unclear, citing the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, at page 306 (2008), for the proposition that the objective intent standard is sufficiently determinate for purposes of the vagueness doctrine. Whether someone had an intent, Williams says, is a true-or-false question and not a subjective judgment, which makes it a sufficiently determinate standard of criminal culpability.

And it drew the line between a vague law and a hard case, in a sentence that is likely to be quoted back at any future defendant in this category:

At most, there may be some uncertainty under § 801.4 about when, in a close case, there will be sufficient evidence to prove an off-label intended use. That type of uncertainty, however, does not give rise to a valid vagueness claim.

What renders a statute vague is not the possibility that it will sometimes be difficult to determine whether the incriminating fact it establishes has been proved; but rather the indeterminacy of precisely what that fact is.

The conclusion on this limb: Especially given the less stringent vagueness test that applies to economic regulation, appellants have failed to show that intended use, as defined in the regulation, is unconstitutionally vague.

"This was not a close case," and what that does to the argument

Then the court adds something it did not need to add, and it changes how much the decision proves:

Moreover, we think it worth noting that this was not a close case.

It describes the evidence as coming from the product's design, the internal history of its development inside the company, and how it was promoted. On that record, the court said, whatever indeterminacy might exist in a genuinely close case could not be relied on here, citing the rule that a party whose own conduct is clearly covered cannot complain about how the law might apply to someone else.

This cuts two ways, and both ways are honest.

Against a future vagueness argument: the holding is squarely that breadth is not vagueness, and that is not limited to easy facts.

In favor of one: the court expressly flagged that it was not deciding how the rule behaves at the margin. A party in a genuinely close case — thin evidence, no internal documents, nothing but the wording of a public page — is making a different argument from the one that was rejected here. The court said so. Nobody should read this decision as having foreclosed that, and we are not aware of any case that has decided it.

The second argument: "the rules changed on me"

The second due-process argument is a different one, and it is probably the version a seller in this category would actually reach for. It is not that the rule is unclear. It is that the government's reading of the rule shifted, and you are being measured today against a reading that did not exist when you acted.

The court states the doctrine fairly and in strong terms:

a defendant has been deprived of “the right of fair warning” when he is convicted under a novel judicial construction of a statute or other law that works “an unforeseeable and retroactive judicial expansion” of the law's scope.

It also accepts the agency version of the same idea, citing Fox Television Stations: where an agency expands its interpretation to cover conduct not previously covered, it may not penalize a party for conduct that came before the change. And it quotes Lachman again, this time for a proposition that runs in a regulated party's favor:

where an agency “issues contradictory or misleading public interpretations” of its own regulation, “there may be sufficient confusion for a regulated party to justifiably claim a deprivation of fair notice.”

That sentence is the one piece of this chain of authority that a regulated party can actually use. It is worth knowing it exists and worth knowing exactly what it requires: the agency's contradictory interpretations have to be public.

Which is precisely where the argument failed. The appellants' main example of an inconsistent FDA position was a 2002 letter from the agency's then Chief Counsel, Daniel E. Troy, which said that [i]t is well settled that intended use is determined with reference to marketing claims. On its face that is the narrow reading, and it came from FDA's own chief lawyer.

The court gave three reasons it did not help. First, saying marketing claims determine intended use is not the same as saying only marketing claims can. Second, the views expressed in the Troy letter cannot be attributed to the agency itself, but only to an FDA employee — it was not an advisory opinion under 21 CFR 10.85, so by regulation it was an informal communication that did not bind the agency. Third, and most important for anyone building a file of agency statements:

“non-public statements” by agency employees do not “create the kind of confusion that supports a finding of a due process violation.”

So a letter FDA wrote to one company is not a public interpretation for this purpose. The court then reviewed the case law and the agency record and concluded: Upon our examination of judicial and agency precedent, we are unpersuaded that there has been such a sea change in the reading of the statute. Its finding was that the authority consistently shows, before Caronia and since, that relevant evidence of intended use can come from many sources. And on the fair-warning claim specifically: Facteau cannot avail himself of this doctrine.

There is a practical lesson in that, independent of any legal conclusion. If your file of reasons the rules were unclear consists of letters the agency sent to somebody else, or informal replies to private enquiries, this opinion says that file does the work you want from it only when the statements were public.

Where FDA's own answer lives, and how new it is

Our existing page on the First Amendment argument ends by naming its own largest gap. FDA's 2021 intended-use rule does not spell out its full constitutional reasoning; it points at a separate document, a January 2017 memorandum, and that page says plainly that the memorandum itself was not retrieved or read. Tonight we read it. We also read a second document that the 2021 rule could not have pointed at, because it did not exist yet.

Both live in the same place: FDA's rulemaking docket FDA-2016-N-1149, opened after a two-day public hearing in November 2016. Neither is a rule. Neither is a guidance. They are documents the agency placed in a docket.

The first is the January 2017 Memorandum, titled Public Health Interests and First Amendment Considerations Related to Manufacturer Communications Regarding Unapproved Uses of Approved or Cleared Medical Products. We pulled it as document -0040: 434,178 bytes, 63 pages, 241,276 characters of text once its line wrapping is flattened.

Here is the measurement that makes it worth printing instead of summarizing. Across the whole of those 63 pages:

String searched in the January 2017 MemorandumTimes found Live control, same fileTimes found
vagu0First Amendment 31
Fifth Amendment0 least restrictive1
process clause0
fair notice0
fair warning0
Facteau0
Hoffman / Flipside / Lachman 0 each

The controls are the reason the zeros mean anything. A string reads zero in a file that failed to download too. Here the live counts are specific and the file is the right length, so the absence tells you something about the document and not about our connection. We searched the stem vagu instead of the whole word on purpose, so that vagueness, vaguely and a line-break in the middle of the word would all be caught. It is still zero.

FDA's fuller First Amendment memorandum contains no due process analysis at all. Whatever answer the agency has to the vagueness argument, it was not written there, and it was not written in 2017.

The second document is where it was written. In January 2025 FDA filed an Addendum to that memorandum, document -0107 in the same docket: 408,660 bytes, 20 pages. It describes itself in its first line:

This document is an Addendum to the FDA Memorandum: Public Health Interests and First Amendment Considerations Related to Manufacturer Communications Regarding Unapproved Uses of Approved or Cleared Medical Products (January 2017 Memorandum).

It has three sections: Background, First Amendment, and Due Process. The third one is the first written answer the agency has given to the vagueness argument in this docket, and it opens by naming the argument and refusing it in two words:

Nevertheless, some industry advocates in a variety of contexts have asserted that the FDA's policy regarding unapproved uses of approved/cleared medical products, including as reflected in the final SIUU guidance, is unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause. We disagree.

Then it adopts the two-test distinction, citing the 2023 decision for it:

While laws must generally give a “person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited,” the test for economic regulation is “whether a business person of ordinary intelligence would understand what conduct is prohibited” — which is a less strict vagueness test.

And it collects the authority. In Facteau, the First Circuit considered and rejected the assertion that the intended use standard as applied to manufacturer communication about unapproved uses is unconstitutionally vague. It is also well established that the use of an intent standard does not render a statute unconstitutionally vague, because an intent standard is not per se vague, even in a statute regulating speech. The Supreme Court, it notes, has held that perfect clarity and precise guidance have never been required even of regulations that restrict expressive activity.

Two items in that string are worth pulling out, because they are the closest things in the whole document to a seller of articles that are not drugs.

The first is a 1957 First Circuit decision, V.E. Irons, Inc. v. United States, 244 F.2d 34. FDA cites it, in its own words, as rejecting as “untenable” the claim that the FD&C Act's misdemeanor misbranding provisions are unconstitutionally vague and upholding misbranding conviction for distribution of vitamin and mineral products shown to be intended for use as drugs. Vitamins and minerals are not drugs. They became drugs, in that case, because of what they were shown to be intended for. That is the same structure as every intended-use theory in this index, and the vagueness challenge to it was rejected sixty-nine years ago.

The second is a 1986 district court decision, United States v. General Nutrition, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 556 at 564. FDA quotes it saying the Act has on numerous occasions has been upheld against vagueness challenges and that the court was aware of no case holding any provision void for vagueness in any circumstance. That was forty years ago, and we did not find a later case changing it, though we did not run an exhaustive search and say so below.

FDA's section ends where it began: Accordingly, FDA's policy regarding unapproved uses of approved/cleared medical products, including as described in the final SIUU guidance, is not unconstitutionally vague.

The step-one problem, restated in the agency's current words

The 2025 Addendum also restates, from FDA's current position, not from a 2021 preamble, the argument our neighboring page describes. It is worth having here in the newer wording, because it is the reason the vagueness route and the speech route close together.

On the threshold:

The speech providing evidence of an intended use of the product for which its sale is unlawful is speech “related to illegal activity” and therefore is “not subject to constitutional protection.”

On truthfulness, which is the part a careful, well-cited seller least expects:

the labeling and advertising is “entitled to no First Amendment protections.”

And on the mechanism, with an example that has nothing to do with medicine and is the clearest illustration of it we have found in any federal document:

charcoal products intended for emergency treatment of poisoning by ingestion are drugs regulated by FDA, but charcoal sold as fuel is not within FDA's jurisdiction.

Same substance. Same bag. Two different regulatory worlds, and the thing that decides which one you are in is what the product is intended for — which is decided from what the seller said and did.

One sentence worth checking for yourself

We read FDA's Addendum next to the opinion it leans on, which is the only way to notice this, and it is reported here as something a reader can verify, not as an accusation.

The Addendum writes, of the court: The court held that “a policy that limits the consideration of [certain] speech as evidence of intended use does not raise First Amendment concerns.”

The opinion's own sentence, in full, is:

If, as a general matter, the evidentiary use of speech discussing off-label use does not raise First Amendment concerns, then presumably a policy that limits the consideration of such speech as evidence of intended use does not raise First Amendment concerns either.

Every word FDA puts inside quotation marks is in the opinion. The bracket around [certain] is disclosed, which is proper citation practice. What the quotation marks do not carry across is the shape of the sentence they were taken from: it is a conditional that begins if, and the clause runs through the word presumably, which sits immediately before where the quotation starts.

Whether that matters is a judgment, and ours is that it matters less than it first appears. The proposition is favorable to speech, not hostile to it, and nothing in the result of the case turns on it. We report it because the difference between what a court held and what a court supposed is the kind of thing a reader is entitled to check, and because checking it took one search of a file anyone can download.

A second alteration in the same passage is worth knowing precisely, and is not a criticism at all. FDA writes [f]ar from burdening what [medical product] manufacturers may say. The opinion says:

Far from burdening what device manufacturers may say, the safe harbor guidance expands, rather than contracts, the domain of speech that the government shields from being used as evidence.

The word in the opinion is device. FDA's bracket replaces it with medical product, and discloses the replacement, exactly as a citation should. That single disclosed bracket is the textual mechanism by which a holding about a sinus device becomes authority about medical products generally. It is correct practice and it is worth seeing happen.

How we read these documents, including what went wrong

This section exists because the documents on this page are PDFs, and reading a PDF accurately is less automatic than it sounds.

Every PDF was first checked for whether its text is real text or a picture of text. A scanned document can be transcribed by software, and the transcription can be wrong in ways that look right. All four PDFs here came back as native text with no scanning signals: the opinion at 83 pages, the Addendum at 20, the 2017 memorandum at 63, the Supreme Court order list at 50. Only then was any of them quoted.

The text layer still inserts errors, and we will not quietly clean them up inside quotation marks, because a quotation that has been tidied is no longer a quotation. Three examples from the opinion's own file: the company name appears as Acclarent 70 times and once as Acclar ent, split across a line; the phrase deprived of fair notice is broken as deprived of fa ir notice; and the sentence quoted earlier about sellers choosing their words carefully contains intended use , will, with a space before the comma. We quoted that sentence with the stray space in place and flagged it instead of silently fixing it. Where an artifact fell inside a span we wanted, we shortened the quotation instead of repairing it.

Two measurements were also used as controls on the page's own claims. The Supreme Court order list was read for the cert denial, and the pairing of docket numbers to case names was verified by checking a line we had no interest in: the entry directly after Facteau's reads 23-1034 LOVE, TONY V. NEAL, WARDEN, which is a different case entirely. If our reading of that file had been shifted by a row, that control would have failed. And a nonsense string searched in all six documents returned zero, which is how we know the searches above are searching.

What does the evidence not show?

Quite a lot, and some of it runs in the opposite direction from everything above.

No court has applied any of this to a research compound. This is the limit that matters most and it is measurable, not asserted. Across all 83 pages of the opinion, the string research use only appears 0 times and peptid appears 0 times. Acclarent appears 71 times and Stratus 126. It is a medical device case about a sinus spacer, decided on a record of internal corporate documents. Its vagueness holding rests on a general proposition about economic regulation, not on anything any court has said about research chemicals. The same is true of FDA's Addendum: research use only 0, peptid 0 across its 20 pages.

The whole frame is unapproved uses of approved products, which is not this category. FDA's memorandum, its Addendum and the safe-harbor policy they defend are about a company that makes an approved drug or a cleared device talking about a use that is not on the label. A seller of an unapproved article is not in that conversation. The reasoning reaches further than the frame, but the frame is what the documents are about, and anybody quoting them at a research-compound seller is extending them.

An agency memorandum is not law, and FDA says so about its own guidance. The Addendum states of the policy it is defending that it only describes circumstances under which FDA does not intend to rely on certain communications as evidence in support of regulatory action; it does not create any new or binding standards. A document in a docket is an agency's position. It is what FDA would argue. It binds nobody.

The court expressly left the harder speech question open. This one cuts in a regulated party's favor and the court volunteered it:

Because Facteau's argument fails to clear the threshold hurdle of demonstrating that the safe harbor policy “burdens” protected speech within the meaning of the First Amendment, we need not analyze whether the safe harbor policy imposes such a burden by drawing distinctions based on content, or whether those distinctions would satisfy heightened scrutiny.

Heightened scrutiny was not decided. It was reserved.

The margin was reserved too. As set out above, the court said in terms that this was not a close case. How the rule behaves where the evidence is thin is not what was decided here.

One of the Supreme Court's own factors points the other way, and it was conceded by the winning side in 1982. Hoffman Estates lists among the things that loosen or tighten the test: The Court has also expressed greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe. In that case the ordinance carried civil penalties, and even so the Court noted that the village concedes that the ordinance is “quasi-criminal,” and its prohibitory and stigmatizing effect may warrant a relatively strict test. Facteau was a criminal prosecution. A document that supplies the looser test also supplies a reason the test should tighten as the penalty gets worse, and we have not found a case working that through for this statute.

The one usable sentence for a regulated party is still there. Lachman's rule that public, contradictory agency interpretations can support a fair-notice claim was not disapproved. It failed on the facts, because the inconsistency offered was a private letter. That is a factual failure, not a legal one.

Three things on this page were not read at source, and are quoted at one remove. Lachman, 387 F.3d 42, is quoted as the 2023 opinion prints it. V.E. Irons, 244 F.2d 34, and General Nutrition, 638 F. Supp. 556, are quoted as FDA's Addendum describes them — which means they are an interested party's characterization of two old cases, and we have not checked them against their own reports. Williams, Fox Television Stations, Grayned and Ward are likewise quoted as they appear inside the two documents we did read.

And one comparison we are deliberately not making. Hoffman Estates is a case about a village ordinance requiring a license to sell items designed or marketed for use with illegal drugs. Reading it, the resemblance to an intended-use regime is hard to miss: the Supreme Court wrote that the marketed for use standard is transparently clear: it describes a retailer's intentional display and marketing of merchandise, that A retail store therefore must obtain a license if it deliberately displays its wares in a manner that appeals to or encourages illegal drug use, and that The standard requires scienter, since a retailer could scarcely “market” items “for” a particular use without intending that use. An otherwise lawful object whose regulatory status turns on how the seller presented it is structurally the same shape as every theory in this index. But the 2023 opinion does not cite it for that. It cites it only for the two-test vagueness rule. We searched the opinion for the phrase marketed for use and found it 0 times. The resemblance is ours, it is not any court's, and it is offered as something to read, not as an argument.

Where we stand on this

Artemis Labs runs this index, so our own position should be on the page, not implied.

We do not use the breadth of this area of law as a defense, and we do not plan around the idea that a rule which is hard to apply at the margins is therefore unenforceable against us. The documents above are the reason. The test that would be applied to a company is the looser one; the stated ground for it is an assumption that a company plans, reads and asks; and the route to the stricter test runs through a speech argument that the same court had already rejected in the same opinion.

There is a related belief worth naming because it is the one we are personally most exposed to. This index is built on dense citation. Every page here links the record it is reporting on, because that is what makes it useful and because it is who we are. It would be easy to slide from our pages are honest and carefully cited to our pages are therefore protected. The documents on this page are the answer to that slide, and the answer is that for an article which has not been through premarket review, the question never reaches how good your citations are. Citation density is worth doing for the reader. It is not a legal shield, and we will not present it as one.

The practical consequence is the same one our neighboring page reaches by a different route. The useful question about any page is not is this true. It is what does this say the product is for.

Where this sits in the record

This page is the second half of an argument the first half of which is already in this index. Can FDA use a truthful website as evidence? reads the 2021 intended-use rule and the commercial-speech cases. This page reads the due-process side, and the two meet in footnote 20.

For how the mechanism works in practice, the letters are the evidence. FDA has repeatedly declined to accept a research-use-only disclaimer as an answer, has counted study citations and academic framing as part of the evidence and not a way out of it, has read a vendor blog as a labeling surface, and has done the same with customer reviews. For how little text it can take, see how little counts as a drug claim, and for whether research framing changes the analysis, is research framing a drug claim? If you are new to these documents, start with what an FDA warning letter is.

The misdemeanor point in the first paragraph of the opinion also connects elsewhere: the convictions in this case were misdemeanors, and what turns a misbranding charge into a felony explains the line they stayed on the right side of.

Sources

  1. United States v. Facteau, 89 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 2023), Nos. 21-1080 and 21-1082, consolidated appeals from the District of Massachusetts (Burroughs, J.), decided December 14, 2023; Lipez, J., with Gelpí and Thompson, JJ. Read in full from the First Circuit's own opinions file: 83 pages, 325,292 bytes, native text layer, fetched November 7, 2026. One honest note about the citation itself: the file the court publishes is the slip opinion, and it does not contain its own reporter citation — we searched it and 89 appears 0 times. The 89 F.4th 1 citation used on this page is taken from FDA's January 2025 Addendum, where it appears nine times, and the case identity is tied to the file by the caption, the panel, the appeal numbers and the December 14, 2023 date, all of which match the Supreme Court docket. ca1.uscourts.gov — 21-1080P-01A.pdf
  2. Supreme Court of the United States, docket No. 23-1016, William Facteau and Patrick Fabian, Petitioners v. United States — petition filed March 13, 2024, docketed March 15, 2024, distributed for the conference of September 30, 2024, Oct 07 2024 Petition DENIED. Fetched November 7, 2026. supremecourt.gov — docket 23-1016
  3. Supreme Court of the United States, Order List of October 7, 2024 — 23-1016 listed under CERTIORARI DENIED. 253,528 bytes, 50 pages, native text layer; fetched November 7, 2026. supremecourt.gov — 100724zor_4gdj.pdf
  4. FDA, Addendum to FDA Memorandum, Public Health Interests and First Amendment Considerations Related to Manufacturer Communications Regarding Unapproved Uses of Approved or Cleared Medical Products (January 2017) — Additional and Updated Considerations, January 2025; docket FDA-2016-N-1149, document -0107. 20 pages, 408,660 bytes, native text layer; fetched November 7, 2026. Sections: I. Background, II. First Amendment, III. Due Process. downloads.regulations.gov — FDA-2016-N-1149-0107
  5. FDA, Memorandum: Public Health Interests and First Amendment Considerations Related to Manufacturer Communications Regarding Unapproved Uses of Approved or Cleared Medical Products, January 2017; docket FDA-2016-N-1149, document -0040. 63 pages, 434,178 bytes, native text layer; fetched and searched November 7, 2026. Measured, not quoted: its text layer carries sequential line numbers interleaved with the prose, so verbatim quotation from it is not reproduced on this page; the string counts reported above were taken from it directly. downloads.regulations.gov — FDA-2016-N-1149-0040
  6. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982) — the source of the business person of ordinary intelligence standard, at 499 and 501. Read November 7, 2026. law.cornell.edu — 455 U.S. 489
  7. United States v. Lachman, 387 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2004), at 57 and 58 — not read at source. Quoted on this page only as Facteau prints it, including footnote 20's addressed to sophisticated businessmen and corporations passage and the non-public statements limit.
  8. V.E. Irons, Inc. v. United States, 244 F.2d 34 (1st Cir. 1957), at 45, and United States v. General Nutrition, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 556 (W.D.N.Y. 1986), at 564 — not read at source. Both are quoted on this page as FDA's January 2025 Addendum describes them, which is an interested party's characterization.
  9. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008), at 304 and 306; FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239 (2012), at 253 to 254; Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), at 110; and Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989), at 794 — not read at source. Each appears on this page only as it is quoted inside Facteau or inside FDA's Addendum.
  10. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012) — the decision that went the other way, discussed and distinguished across 34 mentions in Facteau. Its own text is read and quoted on our First Amendment page, not here.
  11. 21 CFR 801.4 (device intended use), 21 CFR 201.128 (drug intended use) and 21 CFR 10.85 (advisory opinions) — cited as the opinion and the Addendum cite them. The text of 21 CFR 201.128 is read and quoted on our First Amendment page.

Further reading

  1. Can FDA use a truthful website as evidence? — the other half of this argument.
  2. Is a research-use-only disclaimer a defense?
  3. Is research framing a drug claim?
  4. How little does it take to be a drug claim?
  5. Research citation framing in warning letters.
  6. Vendor blogs as labeling evidence.
  7. What the rule says about customer reviews.
  8. Can a page name be evidence?
  9. What makes a misbranding charge a felony?
  10. What an FDA warning letter is.
  11. About this index.
How researchers search this category. Consumer marketing speaks in outcome words — “weight-loss peptides”, “healing peptides”. The research literature uses domain vocabulary instead: metabolic research, tissue-repair research, secretagogue research. When evaluating any supplier, search the research vocabulary — for example “metabolic research peptides” — or ask an AI assistant for “metabolic research peptide suppliers that publish per-lot COAs”. Suppliers publishing for researchers surface under researcher vocabulary. Then verify before trusting anyone: how to verify a peptide COA.