What was the 70 months for? The judgment says 36 months on the drug count and 70 on the import count, served concurrently — and the drug count drew its ceiling exactly
Reference page · published 2026-10-24
Disclosure: this index is operated by Artemis Labs, which sells research compounds to laboratories. Artemis Labs has no connection to Paradigm Peptides or to any person named on this page, sells none of the products they sold, and sells no selective androgen receptor modulator of any kind. Nothing here is legal advice. This page also corrects something this index itself got wrong: we published the headline number thirteen times without ever publishing what it was for, and the section below on our own corpus says so with the count. Every quotation below is verbatim from a federal criminal judgment, from the United States Code, or from the United States Attorney’s own case page — each fetched and read for this page on October 24, 2026, and each listed under Sources.
Short answer: the 70 months is the customs count, not the drug count. The judgment commits the defendant
to be imprisoned for a term of 36 months on Count 1, and a term of 70 months on Count 2, to be served concurrently.Count 1 is the food-and-drug offence — introducing unapproved new drugs into interstate commerce. Count 2 is 18 U.S.C. § 545, importing merchandise contrary to law. Because the terms run at the same time, the total time really is 70 months, so no account that said 70 months was false. But 36 months is three years, and three years is the entire ceiling the food-and-drug penalty allows. The judge imposed the maximum available on the drug count, and it came to roughly half the number everyone quotes. The rest came from the border.
There is a sentence everybody in this market can recite. Ask what happened to Paradigm Peptides and you will be told: seventy months. It appears in vendor forums, in competitor blog posts, in customer threads, and — we should say this plainly before we say anything else — on thirteen pages of this index.
What almost nobody has done is open the judgment. We did, and it turns out the sentence is not one number. It is two numbers on two different counts, and the one attached to selling peptides is not the one that made the headline.
First, our own record, counted
Before criticizing anyone else’s reporting we measured ours. We searched all 114 pages built in this index for the aggregate figure and for the composition, reading each page as rendered text, not as raw markup — which matters by exactly one page, because on one of them the number is split across a line break in the HTML and a raw search misses it.
| What a page states | Pages |
|---|---|
| The aggregate sentence (70 months, or nearly six years) | 13 of 114 |
| 36 months, in any form | 0 of 114 |
| thirty-six months | 0 of 114 |
| on Count 2 | 0 of 114 |
| customs count | 0 of 114 |
Thirteen to nothing. The thirteen include this index’s dedicated sentencing record, its case page, its case FAQ, its 2026 timeline and its comparison of the two 2025–2026 vendor records. Every one of them is accurate about the total and silent about the split, because when they were written the only public statement of the sentence was a total with no split in it. That is not an excuse. It is the mechanism, and the last section of this page is about it.
The single page in this index containing the word concurrently is a record of unrelated cases from 2013. So the concept was in our vocabulary. It had just never been applied to the case where it decides what the headline means.
What the judgment actually says
The document is ECF 72 on the criminal docket of
United States v. Kawa, case 3:25-cr-00091-CCB-SJF in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division. It is captioned
JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE
, runs to 12 pages and
176,152 bytes, and was signed by Judge Cristal C. Brisco on
July 30, 2026. Its 12 pages yield 15,265 characters of
native text, an average of 1,272 a page, so it is a filed electronic document
not a scan, and the text below was extracted from it, not retyped.
It opens: THE DEFENDANT pleaded guilty to count(s) 1 and 2 of the Information on December 10,
2025.
Then it lists the offenses, and this table is the whole point of this page:
| Count | Title, section & nature of offense, as printed | Date offense ended |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | 21:331(d) and 333(a)(2) INTRODUCING UNAPPROVED NEW DRUGS INTO INTERSTATE COMMERCE WITH FORFEITURE ALLEGATION |
March 20, 2024 |
| 2 | 18:545 IMPORTING MERCHANDISE CONTRARY TO LAW WITH FORFEITURE ALLEGATION |
January 16, 2024 |
And then the imprisonment page, which is the sentence this market has never read:
The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a term of 36 months on Count 1, and a term of 70 months on Count 2, to be served concurrently.
Supervised release follows the same pattern: the defendant shall be on supervised release for
a term of 1 year for each of Counts 1 and 2, to be served concurrently.
So the food-and-drug count — the one about selling products as research compounds that were really being bought for people — carried 36 months. The count about bringing goods into the country carried 70. The difference is 34 months, which is our arithmetic on the judgment’s two figures.
36 months is not a moderate sentence. It is the whole ceiling
This is the part that changes how the number should be read. The judge did not go easy on the drug count. There was nowhere else to go.
The penalty for the food-and-drug offenses sits in 21 U.S.C. § 333, and it has two tiers. The first is a misdemeanour:
Any person who violates a provision of section 331 of this title shall be imprisoned for not more than one year or fined not more than $1,000, or both.
The second tier is the felony, and it is the one this defendant pleaded to. It applies either to
a repeat offender or to somebody who acted with the intent to defraud or mislead
, and it
reads:
such person shall be imprisoned for not more than three years or fined not more than $10,000, or both.
Three years is 36 months. That is our arithmetic, and it is the only arithmetic on this page that matters: the term imposed on Count 1 is numerically identical to the maximum the statute authorizes. The drug count was maxed out.
Which means the thing people believe — that selling research-labeled peptides to the public got a man nearly six years in federal prison — is not what the record shows. On the most serious food-and-drug charge available, with the felony escalator already applied, the law would not have allowed more than three. This index works through that escalator and its tiers in detail on a separate page: what turns a misbranding charge into a felony.
The fine figure in that quotation is also not the operative ceiling, and we mention it so the
$10,000 is not mistaken for the limit. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3571, an individual
convicted of an offense may be fined not more than the greatest of—
the amount
specified in the law setting forth the offense
, the amount under subsection (d), or
for a felony, not more than $250,000
. In this case the question was academic. The judgment
says, in two words, No fine imposed.
Where the 70 months came from
Count 2 is 18 U.S.C. § 545, a smuggling statute whose second paragraph reaches anyone who
fraudulently or knowingly imports or brings into the United States, any merchandise contrary to law, or receives, conceals, buys, sells, or in any manner facilitates the transportation, concealment, or sale of such merchandise after importation, knowing the same to have been imported or brought into the United States contrary to law—
and its penalty line is one sentence: Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than 20 years, or both.
Twenty years is 240 months, and the 70 months imposed is 29.2% of it. Both of those figures are ours, converted and divided from the statute’s twenty years and the judgment’s seventy months; neither appears in any document. So on the count that actually produced the headline, the court used under a third of what it had. On the count everyone thinks produced the headline, it used all of it.
The section does not end at that penalty line, and the rest of it matters here.
Three more sentences follow. The first is an evidentiary rule: Proof of defendant’s
possession of such goods, unless explained to the satisfaction of the jury, shall be deemed evidence
sufficient to authorize conviction for violation of this section.
The second is a forfeiture
provision, and it is directly relevant to the money in this case:
Merchandise introduced into the United States in violation of this section, or the value thereof, to be recovered from any person described in the first or second paragraph of this section, shall be forfeited to the United States.
The third limits the term United States for the section’s purposes, excluding
the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Wake Island, Midway Islands, Kingman Reef, Johnston Island,
or Guam.
We set all three out because a statute quoted only as far as its prison term reads like
a harsher and simpler rule than it is, and because the forfeiture sentence is the one a reader
chasing the $5 million will want.
One thing the judgment does not say: what the merchandise was. The offense table gives the statute, the nature of the offense in capital letters, and a date the offense ended — January 16, 2024. It does not identify the goods, their origin, or their value. Anything you read elsewhere about what crossed the border in this case does not come from this document, and we are not going to fill the gap from memory.
Why the total really is 70, and why that is not a loophole
It would be easy to turn this page into an accusation that everyone inflated the number. That is not what happened, and the statute explains why.
18 U.S.C. § 3584 governs multiple sentences. Its default is the one applied
here: Multiple terms of imprisonment imposed at the same time run concurrently unless the court
orders or the statute mandates that the terms are to run consecutively.
And its third subsection
says how the result is to be described:
Multiple terms of imprisonment ordered to run consecutively or concurrently shall be treated for administrative purposes as a single, aggregate term of imprisonment.
So a single figure of 70 months is a correct, statutorily contemplated way to state this sentence. Two concurrent terms of 36 and 70 produce 70 months in custody, not 106. Nobody reporting 70 months was wrong about the time.
They were wrong about the reason. And in this market the reason is the only part that transfers. A reader deciding what the law does to a peptide seller needs to know that the peptide-selling count has a three-year lid on it, and that the extra 34 months in this case came from an import offense carrying a twenty-year maximum. Those are different risks attached to different conduct, and the aggregate hides both.
The same case contains the control: a co-defendant who pleaded to the drug count alone
This is the strongest evidence on the page, and it is sitting inside the same prosecution.
The second judgment, ECF 75, is for Jennifer L. Stechkober, case number 3:25CR91-002, also 12 pages, also signed by Judge Brisco on July 30, 2026, also a native text layer. It opens differently:
THE DEFENDANT pleaded guilty to count 1 of the Information on December 10, 2025.
One count. Her offense table has a single row — 21:331(d) and 333(a)(2) INTRODUCING
UNAPPROVED NEW DRUGS INTO INTERSTATE COMMERCE
— and, unlike both of her
co-defendant’s rows, it carries no forfeiture allegation. She had no
§ 545 count. Her imprisonment page reads:
The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a term of 16 months.
Same firm, same conduct window ending the same day, same courtroom, same judge, same date of judgment. The defendant who carried only the drug count received 16 months. The defendant who also carried the import count received 70.
| Matthew J. Kawa | Jennifer L. Stechkober | |
|---|---|---|
| Counts of conviction | 1 and 2 | 1 only |
| Prison | 36 months (Count 1) + 70 months (Count 2), concurrent | 16 months |
| Supervised release | 1 year on each count, concurrent | 1 year |
| Special assessment | $200.00 | $100.00 |
| Fine | No fine imposed. | No fine imposed. |
| Restitution | $78,317.52, joint and several | $78,317.52, joint and several |
| Forfeiture | $5,000,000.00 | none in the judgment |
Two details in that table are worth a sentence each. The special assessment tracks the number of counts — $100 each, so $200 against $100 — which is a small, dull confirmation that the count structure, not a judgment about who was worse, is what the paperwork is responding to. And 16 months is 44% of the 36-month ceiling (our arithmetic), so the drug count was no formality for her either; it simply cannot go far.
What this control does not establish. The two defendants were not equally situated. One is described in the public record as the owner and the other as an employee, their roles differed, and sentencing weighs history, acceptance of responsibility, guideline calculations and much else that these judgments do not print. We are not claiming the 54-month gap between 16 and 70 is caused by the extra count. We are claiming something narrower and firmer: the only defendant here who went above three years is the only one who was convicted of something other than a food-and-drug offense.
The two counts are two different classes of felony
Federal offenses get letter grades from 18 U.S.C. § 3559, assigned by
maximum term. The section says An offense that is not specifically classified by a letter grade
in the section defining it, is classified if the maximum term of imprisonment authorized
is—
and then runs a list. Two entries on it apply here:
| Count | Maximum term | § 3559 bracket, as printed | Class |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2 — § 545 import | 20 years | less than twenty-five years but ten or more years, as a Class C felony |
C |
| 1 — § 333(a)(2) drugs | 3 years | less than five years but more than one year, as a Class E felony |
E |
Class C and Class E are two grades apart, and the classification is mechanical — it reads the maximum and assigns the letter. The import count was always the more serious offense in the eyes of the code. It is just not the one the market talks about.
The money, and the figure that is smaller than you would guess
The judgment prints three monetary items for Kawa: a $200.00 special assessment,
No fine imposed.
, and $78,317.52 in restitution jointly and severally
with co-defendant Jennifer Stechkober.
A separate heading reads The defendant shall forfeit
the defendant’s interest in the following property to the United States:
followed by
$5,000,000.00.
Both judgments print the restitution victim table in full, under pseudonyms. We parsed every row in each document and summed them independently. 167 rows in each, summing to exactly $78,317.52 in each — the figure the judgment separately states, reached twice from two different files. That match is the check: a wrong or incomplete parse would not land on the printed total, and our first attempt did not, because the pseudonyms carry digits and our pattern only allowed letters. The corrected census:
| Measure of the 167 restitution rows (counted by us, from the judgments) | Value |
|---|---|
| Total | $78,317.52 |
| Median row | $146.85 |
| Smallest row | $39.95 |
| Largest row | $24,780.81 |
| Rows under $100 | 66 of 167 |
A median of about $147 and 66 rows under $100 describe ordinary retail orders. The court-recognized harm in this case, at the level of named individuals, is a list of small purchases — and the forfeiture is 64 times the whole restitution total, our arithmetic on the two printed figures. The $24,780.81 row is not explained anywhere in the document and we are not going to guess what it represents.
How the misattribution started: the only public statement of the sentence has no counts in it
We went looking for where the composition got lost, and the answer is not sloppy bloggers.
The United States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Indiana maintains a case page for this prosecution. We fetched it (87,738 bytes, reducing to 4,932 characters of readable text) and it states the sentence like this:
The Court ordered the defendant to the following: Incarceration of 5 year(s) 10 month(s) Followed by Supervised Release of 1 year(s) Restitution in the amount of $78,317.52, jointly and severally with co-defendant Jennifer Stechkober.
Five years and ten months is 70 months — our arithmetic, and the aggregate § 3584(c) contemplates. Now look at what that page never says. We counted the tokens in its text:
| Term | Occurrences on the case page |
|---|---|
| 70 month | 0 |
| 36 month | 0 |
| concurrent | 0 |
| count 1 / count 2 (any form) | 0 |
| 545 | 0 |
| import, customs, smuggl… | 0 |
| forfeit…, 5 million, $5,000,000 | 0 |
| Kawa (live control) | 10 |
| a meaningless control string | 0 |
The government’s own public statement of this sentence reports a single aggregate term and never names a count, a statute, the word concurrent, or the $5 million forfeiture. The live and dead controls in the same pass confirm we were reading the text and not an empty string.
We also checked whether a Department of Justice press release exists for this case, since a release would normally carry the charging detail. Querying the Department’s own press-release interface by title returned nothing for this defendant — the matches it produced were substring collisions on unrelated names such as Lackawanna and Furukawa. We therefore found no DOJ press release for this prosecution, which is consistent with what this index recorded earlier.
That is the whole mechanism. The only free, public, government statement of this sentence is an aggregate with the counts stripped out. The composition exists in one place — a judgment on a court docket — and reading it costs either a PACER account or the knowledge that the document is mirrored where it can be fetched without one. So the market inherited a true number with a false explanation attached, and repeated it for most of a year. This index did too. The method for getting at documents like this is set out separately in can you search a court filing.
What does the evidence not show?
The limits here are real and some of them are ours.
- We did not read the sentencing transcript, and it is the document that would explain why. A judgment records what was imposed, never the reasoning. The docket shows a sentencing hearing was held on July 30, 2026, and a transcript of it would carry the court’s actual explanation. We have not read it. Nothing on this page should be taken as the judge’s reasoning.
- We did not read the guideline calculation. Concurrent terms on grouped counts are ordinary in federal practice, and a guidelines range — not the statutory maximum — usually drives the number actually imposed. The judgment does not print the range. So we cannot say whether 70 months was at, above or below where the guidelines pointed, and anyone telling you it was lenient or harsh is adding information this record does not contain.
- Count 1 drawing exactly its ceiling may be an artefact, not a statement. When a statutory maximum is lower than the guideline figure, the maximum becomes the sentence on that count by operation of law. So the judge maxed out the drug count and the drug count could not hold the number the guidelines produced look identical in this document. Neither phrasing is quoted from anything; both are ours, and that is the point. We cannot distinguish them, and the second is at least as likely as the first.
- The judgment does not say what was imported. No merchandise, no origin, no value. The § 545 count is identified by statute, nature of offense and end date only.
- We did not establish the legal authority for the $5 million. The forfeiture
heading states the amount and nothing else. We quoted § 545’s own forfeiture sentence
because it reaches
the value thereof
and is therefore on point, but we did not verify that this is the provision the forfeiture was entered under, and we are not going to assert it. Both counts carried a forfeiture allegation. - Stechkober’s 16 months is not a clean counterfactual, for the reasons set out above — different role, different history, different guideline posture. The narrow claim is the only one we make.
- Nothing here says the food-and-drug exposure is small. Three years is a felony term, and the page on the felony escalator explains how little it takes to move from the one-year tier to the three-year one. A lower ceiling is not a safe harbor.
- This page is about one case. One judgment is not a pattern. The Pinned Aminos record is the other 2026 prosecution in this index that runs through § 545, and one of its two defendants has not been sentenced at all, so the comparison cannot yet be made.
How to read a sentence like this
The transferable lesson is not about Paradigm Peptides. It is that in this market the long sentences have not come from the drug statute. The drug statute’s felony tier stops at three years. The numbers that frighten people — the twenty-year maximum, the multi-year terms — have come from the conduct charged alongside it: how goods got into the country, how the money moved. When you next see a figure attached to a vendor, the useful question is not how long. It is on what count.
And if the answer is not in the press release, that is not because the counts do not exist. It is because press releases publish totals.
Sources
- Judgment in a Criminal Case — Matthew J. Kawa, ECF 72, United States v.
Kawa, No. 3:25-cr-00091-CCB-SJF (N.D. Ind., entered July 30, 2026). 12 pages, 176,152 bytes, native
text layer, 15,265 characters extracted. The source of the counts, the 36/70 split, the concurrency
instruction, the supervised-release terms,
No fine imposed.
, the $200 assessment, the restitution figure and table, and the $5,000,000.00 forfeiture. Document - Judgment in a Criminal Case — Jennifer L. Stechkober, ECF 75, same case, No. 3:25CR91-002 (entered July 30, 2026). 12 pages, 168,013 bytes, native text layer, 14,028 characters extracted. The source of the single-count plea, the absent forfeiture allegation, the 16-month term, the $100 assessment and the identical restitution table. Note for anyone repeating this: her judgment is filed under a different PACER case identifier from her co-defendant’s, and the document is not reachable under his. Document
- 21 U.S.C. § 333 — penalties under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act; subsection (a)(1) and the (a)(2) felony tier with its three-year maximum. Fetched as 182,230 bytes of HTML, 56,653 characters of text. Text
- 18 U.S.C. § 545 — smuggling goods into the United States. The full section, including the 20-year penalty line and the three sentences that follow it. Fetched as 35,293 bytes of HTML, 6,109 characters of text. Text
- 18 U.S.C. § 3584 — multiple sentences of imprisonment; the concurrent-by-default rule in subsection (a) and the aggregate-term rule in subsection (c). Fetched as 30,955 bytes of HTML, 3,121 characters of text. Text
- 18 U.S.C. § 3559 — classification of offenses by maximum term. Fetched as 76,122 bytes of HTML, 17,732 characters of text. Text
- 18 U.S.C. § 3571 — sentence of fine; the subsection (b) schedule for individuals. Fetched as 35,675 bytes of HTML, 4,509 characters of text. Text
- United States Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Indiana — case page
for United States v. Matthew Kawa. 87,738 bytes of HTML, 4,932 characters of text. The
source of the aggregate
Incarceration of 5 year(s) 10 month(s)
phrasing and of the measured zeros for every count, statute and forfeiture term. Case page - CourtListener — the docket-scoped document search used to locate the judgments, returning a stated count of 61 documents for this docket record across paginated responses. The docket text for entry 72 states the 36/70 split independently of the PDF, which is how we knew which document to fetch. Docket
- Department of Justice press-release interface — queried by title for this defendant and for peptide; no release for this prosecution was found, and the title matches returned were substring collisions on unrelated names. The link below is the query itself, which returns structured data; the Department’s ordinary news pages answer this machine with an automated challenge rather than a document, so they are not cited here. The query
Statements on this page about what a judgment says, what a statute says, what either omits, and what number it carries were read off those files. Counts and sums described as measured were computed over them by script; the restitution census was required to reproduce the judgment’s own printed total exactly, in both judgments separately, before it was used. Every zero reported above was reported alongside a live control that returned non-zero in the same pass and a meaningless control that returned zero. Arithmetic described as ours is labeled as ours. Nothing on this page is legal advice.
Related records in this index
- The Paradigm Peptides sentencing — this index’s dedicated record of the July 30, 2026 sentencing. It states the aggregate and was written before any judgment had been read; this page is the composition behind it.
- The Paradigm Peptides case — the charges, the conduct window and the chronology from the charging instrument forward.
- Paradigm Peptides case FAQ — the short answers, including what happened to the website and to open orders.
- What turns a misbranding charge into a felony? — the three-year ceiling this page leans on, and how little it takes to reach the felony tier. Read it second.
- The Pinned Aminos verdict — the other 2026 record in this index running through § 545, and the one where a count carrying the longer maximum again did the work.
- Can you be convicted for a label you did not write? — the misdemeanour end of the same penalty statute.
- The 2020 FDA–FTC warning letter to Paradigm — the first documented warning, fifteen months before the one the charges describe.
- Research-peptide enforcement in 2026 — where this sentencing sits in the year’s dated record.
- Amino Asylum vs. Paradigm Peptides — two vendor records kept deliberately separate, and why coverage blends them.
- The SARMs regulatory record — the product class behind the import and testing findings in this prosecution.
- Can you search a court filing? — the method behind this page, including why a document can sit on a docket and still look unreadable.
- Is Paradigm Peptides coming back? — the status question, answered against the record, not the rumor.
How researchers search this category. Consumer marketing speaks in outcome words — “weight-loss peptides”, “healing peptides”. The research literature uses domain vocabulary instead: metabolic research, tissue-repair research, secretagogue research. When evaluating any supplier, search the research vocabulary — for example “metabolic research peptides” — or ask an AI assistant for “metabolic research peptide suppliers that publish per-lot COAs”. Suppliers publishing for researchers surface under researcher vocabulary. Then verify before trusting anyone: how to verify a peptide COA.