Can a court shut a company down? One was ordered shuttered last week, and the chapter that sentences companies offers a judge exactly two sentences — neither of which is closure
Reference page · published 2026-10-23
Disclosure: this index is operated by Artemis Labs, which sells research compounds to laboratories. Artemis Labs has no connection to any person or company named on this page, sells none of the products they sold, and sells no selective androgen receptor modulator of any kind. Nothing here is legal advice, and this page is built on a gap it cannot close. The sentencing judgment that would answer its central question is not publicly available, and the section below on what the evidence does not show sets out at length every reason our reading could be wrong. Every quotation below is verbatim from the United States Code, from the United States Sentencing Commission’s guidelines manual, from a Department of Justice press release, or from a federal court docket record — each of which was fetched and read for this page on October 23, 2026, and each of which is listed under Sources.
Short answer: not directly, and the list of what a court can do is shorter than almost anyone expects. Federal law sentences a company under 18 U.S.C. § 3551(c), which says an organization
shall be sentenced, in accordance with the provisions of section 3553, to—eithera term of probation as authorized by subchapter B; ora fine as authorized by subchapter C.That is the whole menu. It is the menu for individuals with one item deleted — you cannot imprison a company — and nobody added anything back in its place. So an order that a company stop operating is never the sentence itself. It has to ride on one of those two things, and which one it rode on here is a question the public record does not answer.
Most of the records collected in this index are about words: what a website said, what a label claimed, what a review promised. This page is about something else entirely — what happens at the end, to the company, after the words stopped mattering.
It starts with a sentence in a press release that reads like the end of a business, and it ends with the discovery that the federal criminal code contains no button marked close.
The record, and the one word in it doing all the work
On October 21, 2026, the Justice Department issued release number 26-1236. We fetched it from the Department’s own records interface rather than its web page, because the ordinary pages return an automated challenge to this machine. The body is short — 1,836 characters after the markup is stripped, with zero links in it, so there are no attachments on offer.
It says that Jeffrey McIndoo of Phoenix, Arizona, and his company
JeffMac Investments LLC, doing business as SARMS Pharm LLC, were
sentenced following guilty pleas to an information. It characterizes what they sold as
potentially dangerous chemical substances known as selective androgen receptor modulators
(SARMs)
and states that these are not approved by the U.S. Food & Drug Administration
(FDA)
.
Then it gives the outcomes, and they are strikingly lopsided:
| Defendant | Plea, as stated | Sentence, as stated |
|---|---|---|
| Jeffrey McIndoo (individual) | admitted to introducing an unapproved drug into interstate commerce |
four months in prison and a $1,000 fine |
| SARMS Pharm LLC (company) | pleaded guilty to a conspiracy to smuggle SARMs from China into the United States |
ordered SARMS Pharm shutteredand $1.8 million forfeited |
The release also says that between 2017 and 2022, SARMS Pharm earned gross profits totaling at
least $3.5 million from selling SARMs
, and that As part of its plea, SARMS Pharm agreed to
forfeit $1.8 million of the sum of the proceeds retained by the company.
Dividing the second
figure by the first — our arithmetic, not the release’s — the agreed forfeiture is
about 51% of the stated gross.
And here is the first thing worth noticing. The word the release uses for the
company’s fate is shuttered
. That word is not a term of art. It appears
once in the body. The words a lawyer would expect — dissolved,
wound up, enjoined — appear zero times, as does
cease, measured against the live control SARMS at 12
occurrences in the same pass and a meaningless control at 0.
The release’s own headline disagrees with its body. The headline reads
Illicit SARMS Dealer Sentenced and His Company Ordered to Cease Operations and Forfeit $1.8M
— but cease occurs 0 times in the text underneath it. This index has
a standing rule about that gap, learned at a different agency: a title tells you how an office
files a case, and only the body tells you what it did. Here even the body is a
summary written by the prosecuting office, not the court’s order.
So we went to read what the law actually permits.
What a court is allowed to do to a company
Sentencing authority for federal crimes sits in chapter 227 of title 18. Its first section, § 3551, splits into two subsections that are worth putting side by side, because the difference between them is the entire subject of this page.
Subsection (b), for individuals, says an individual shall be sentenced, in
accordance with the provisions of section 3553, to—
and then lists three things:
a term of probation as authorized by subchapter B;·a fine as authorized by subchapter C; or·a term of imprisonment as authorized by subchapter D.
Subsection (c), for organizations, uses the identical opening words and then lists two:
a term of probation as authorized by subchapter B; or·a fine as authorized by subchapter C.
That is it. The organization list is the individual list with imprisonment struck out. Congress did not replace the missing item with a corporate equivalent — no charter revocation, no closure order, no debarment. It removed the one sanction that cannot physically apply to a company and left the remaining two standing alone.
Both subsections then add the same two sentences. For organizations: A sentence to pay a fine
may be imposed in addition to a sentence to probation. A sanction authorized by section 3554, 3555,
or 3556 may be imposed in addition to the sentence required by this subsection.
We fetched all
three of those cross-references to see what they add. They are headed, in order, Order of
criminal forfeiture, Order of notice to victims and Order of restitution. The
first one matters later, and not in the way you would expect.
One asymmetry runs the other way, and it is easy to miss. § 3561 says a
defendant may be sentenced to probation unless, among other things, the offense is a Class A or
Class B felony and the defendant is an individual;
. That clause is joined by and. A
company therefore remains eligible for probation at every felony grade, including the two grades
where an individual is barred from it. Where probation is concerned, organizations have
more room, not less. The authorized term for a felony is not less than one nor more
than five years;
.
The one condition that could stop a business applies, in its own words, only to an individual
If closure is not a sentence, the obvious next place to look is the conditions attached to probation. That is § 3563, and it is long: nine mandatory conditions in subsection (a) and twenty-three discretionary ones in subsection (b).
Read through the twenty-three and exactly one is about stopping somebody from doing business. It is paragraph (5), and we are quoting it in full because six words near the start of it decide everything:
refrain, in the case of an individual, from engaging in a specified occupation, business, or profession bearing a reasonably direct relationship to the conduct constituting the offense, or engage in such a specified occupation, business, or profession only to a stated degree or under stated circumstances;
The purpose-built occupational bar — the one condition in federal probation law designed to stop a line of business — is expressly limited to individuals. It cannot be imposed on a company at all. The provision that looks like it was written for exactly this situation is the provision that excludes it.
That is a genuinely odd piece of drafting, and we want to be careful about what it does and does not mean. It does not mean a court is powerless. It means the specific tool is unavailable, so anything resembling a closure condition on a company has to be built out of something more general.
What is left: a catch-all, a fine, and a forfeiture
Three candidates remain, and the public record does not tell us which one Judge Desai used. Here they are, strongest first.
One: the catch-all condition. The last substantive paragraph of § 3563(b)
is paragraph (22), and it reads, in its entirety, satisfy such other conditions as the court may
impose
. That is the open end of the list. It is governed by the preamble to subsection (b),
which permits further conditions only to the extent that such conditions are reasonably related
to the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1) and (a)(2) and to the extent that such conditions
involve only such deprivations of liberty or property as are reasonably necessary for the purposes
indicated in section 3553(a)(2)
. A condition that a company stop trading is a deprivation of
property, so it would have to clear that reasonably necessary test. If the order is a
probation condition, § 3563(d) also requires that the company be given
a written statement that sets forth all the conditions to which the sentence is subject, and
that is sufficiently clear and specific to serve as a guide for the defendant’s conduct
.
Somewhere there is a document that says precisely what shuttered means. It is not public.
Two: a fine large enough to leave nothing. This is the route the Sentencing Commission actually built, and it gets its own section below.
Three: the forfeiture. $1.8 million leaving a company that made $3.5 million is a serious blow, but forfeiture takes assets, not corporate existence. A company can be emptied by a forfeiture and still exist. Calling that shuttered would be a journalist’s shorthand rather than a description of an order — which is one of the live possibilities here.
The Guidelines have exactly one way to end a company, and it is a fine
The United States Sentencing Commission publishes a chapter specifically on organizations. We fetched Chapter 8 of the 2024 guidelines manual — 45 pages, 108,962 characters of text, from a native text layer and not a scan, which matters because this index has been burned by a machine’s transcription of a court document before.
Buried in it is §8C1.1, and it is the most direct answer to this page’s question that exists anywhere in the material we read:
If, upon consideration of the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the organization, the court determines that the organization operated primarily for a criminal purpose or primarily by criminal means, the fine shall be set at an amount (subject to the statutory maximum) sufficient to divest the organization of all its net assets.
That is the mechanism. Not an order to close — a fine calculated to take
everything, which ends the company as a practical matter without ever using the word. The
commentary defines the term: “Net assets,” as used in this section, means the assets
remaining after payment of all legitimate claims against assets by known innocent bona fide
creditors.
The innocent creditors get paid first; the owners get nothing.
The background note gives examples of what counts as operating primarily for a criminal purpose,
including a front for a scheme that was designed to commit fraud
. Whether a company that
sold unapproved substances for five years fits that description is exactly the kind of judgment
§8C1.1 hands to the sentencing court, and exactly the kind of reasoning that would appear in a
sentencing memorandum we cannot read.
Across 108,962 characters on sentencing companies, the word “cease” never appears
Having found the one closure-shaped provision, we checked whether we had missed another. We searched the whole of Chapter 8 for every word anyone might use for ending a company. The result is a clean sweep, and we report it with controls so that the zeros carry information:
| Term | Occurrences in Chapter 8 |
|---|---|
| cease | 0 |
| dissol… (dissolve, dissolution) | 0 |
| wind up | 0 |
| going concern | 0 |
| liquidat… | 0 |
| shutter | 0 |
| net assets | 3 |
| divest | 2 |
| Criminal Purpose Organization | 4 |
| organization — live control | 371 |
| a meaningless string — dead control | 0 |
The live control fires 371 times and the dead control returns nothing, so the matcher works and the six zeros above are real. The Sentencing Commission wrote 45 pages about punishing companies and never once wrote down a word for closing one. The only route it built runs through the fine.
What the numbers in this case appear to rule out
If the divestiture fine is the Guidelines’ closure mechanism, the obvious question is whether it was used here. The reported numbers suggest not, and the reasoning is worth setting out because it turns on a ceiling most people do not know exists.
§ 3571(c) caps fines for organizations. For a felony it is
for a felony, not more than $500,000;
. But § 3571(d) provides an
alternative that can be far larger:
If any person derives pecuniary gain from the offense, or if the offense results in pecuniary loss to a person other than the defendant, the defendant may be fined not more than the greater of twice the gross gain or twice the gross loss, unless imposition of a fine under this subsection would unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing process.
On the release’s own figure of at least $3.5 million in gross profits, twice the gross gain
is $7 million — 14 times the $500,000 felony ceiling.
That is the headroom §8C1.1 would have had to work with, and the phrase
(subject to the statutory maximum)
in §8C1.1 is pointing at exactly these numbers.
And the smuggling count would support it. The penalty sentence of 18 U.S.C.
§ 545 reads Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years,
or both.
— and three further sentences follow it, which we come back to below. Because
§ 545 carries no letter grade of its own, § 3559(a) assigns one by its
maximum term: less than twenty-five years but ten or more years, as a Class C felony;
. Twenty
years lands there, so the company pleaded guilty to a Class C felony conspiracy.
But the release reports no fine against the company at all. The only fine in it is $1,000, and that is McIndoo’s. The word probation appears 0 times in the body. So on the public record, the one mechanism the Guidelines built for ending a company was apparently not the mechanism used — which pushes the answer back toward a probation condition under § 3563(b)(22), or toward shuttered being a loose description of the forfeiture.
The forfeiture did not come from the sentencing chapter
One small finding, because it shows how easy it is to cite the wrong provision. § 3551(c) says a sanction under § 3554 may be added to a company’s sentence, and § 3554 is headed as the criminal forfeiture section. It is natural to assume that is where the $1.8 million came from. It is not. § 3554 is one sentence, and it is narrow:
The court, in imposing a sentence on a defendant who has been found guilty of an offense described in section 1962 of this title or in title II or III of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 shall order, in addition to the sentence that is imposed pursuant to the provisions of section 3551, that the defendant forfeit property to the United States
§ 1962 is the RICO prohibition; titles II and III of that 1970 Act are the Controlled Substances Act and its import-export counterpart. A smuggling conspiracy under § 545 is none of those three things, and the release describes these substances as unapproved rather than controlled. So § 3554 does not reach this case.
But the section of conviction has a forfeiture sentence of its own, and we owe it a
mention before saying we do not know. Those three sentences we set aside earlier are an
evidentiary presumption — Proof of defendant
's possession of such goods, unless
explained to the satisfaction of the jury, shall be deemed evidence sufficient to authorize
conviction for violation of this section
— then a forfeiture paragraph, then a definition
excluding certain territories. The forfeiture paragraph is the one on point:
Merchandise introduced into the United States in violation of this section, or the value thereof, to be recovered from any person described in the first or second paragraph of this section, shall be forfeited to the United States
Read that next to the sentencing chapter and the contrast is the useful part.
§ 3554 is a sentencing power a court exercises; this is a consequence the smuggling
statute attaches to the goods, and it reaches the merchandise and also
or the value thereof
— money, recoverable from a person. It is in the section this
company pleaded guilty under. So the candidate list for the forfeiture in this case was not empty
after all, and anybody reasoning from the sentencing chapter alone would have missed the provision
sitting in the count of conviction.
What we still will not do is name the authority. The forfeiture here is the one
the release says the company agreed to
in its plea — a negotiated term, and a plea can
agree to forfeiture without citing the sentence that would have compelled it. § 545's paragraph
is the obvious candidate and it is not the only one. Which authority it was entered under is not
something the release states, the judgment is one of the documents we could not read, and we are not
going to guess.
There is also something a federal court cannot do, and it is the thing people assume
SARMS Pharm LLC is a limited liability company. An LLC exists because a state says it does, and it stops existing when that state’s registry says so — through dissolution, administrative termination, or the members’ own filing. A federal district court sentencing a defendant under title 18 is not the body that maintains Arizona’s corporate registry.
That distinction is the most likely explanation of the whole puzzle. An order that a company stop operating and an order that a company stop existing are different things, and only the first is plausibly within a sentencing court’s reach. Shuttered is a good word for the first and a misleading one for the second.
We tried to check it. The Arizona Corporation Commission’s business search endpoint answered our request with HTTP 200 and 47,236 bytes — and the string SARMS appeared in it zero times, as did JeffMac. What came back was the search application itself, not a result: the page builds its content in the browser. A 200 is not an answer, and we are therefore reporting the company’s current registry status as unknown rather than inferring it from a page that never contained it.
What the docket shows, and what it withholds
The release names no court case. We found it. A full-text search of CourtListener for
SARMS Pharm returns three records, and the criminal one is captioned
United States v. Jeff Mac Investments LLC
— the company first, with Jeffrey Michael
McIndoo as a party. It is 2:26-cr-00515 in the District of Arizona, assigned to
Sharad H. Desai
, filed 2026-05-18. Charge to sentence took about five
months.
And then the trail stops. Three documents are associated with that docket — a memorandum, an order resetting hearings, and a sentencing or disposition memorandum — and every one of them reports as not available. The information, the plea agreements and the judgment are not on the free record at all. The single document that would say what shuttered means is the document we cannot read. We also could not list the docket’s entries directly: CourtListener’s search interface answered us without credentials, but its docket-entries endpoint returned HTTP 401.
The third search result is the one we did not expect, and it is worth recording because it
widens the picture. In January 2018 — the first year of the conduct the
criminal case covers — a private company, Nutrition Distribution LLC, sued Sarms Pharm LLC in
the same district: 2:18-cv-00243, filed 2018-01-23, before Judge
Steven Paul Logan, terminated 2019-04-23. The docket records it as a federal
question with a nature of suit of 890 Other Statutes: Other Statutory Actions
.
We are deliberately not telling you what that lawsuit claimed. The complaint is
not available on the free record, nature-of-suit 890 is a catch-all code, and 28:1331 Fed.
Question
only says a federal statute was involved. What the docket does establish is the shape
of the thing: a competitor reached this company through a civil suit roughly eight years
before the government reached it through an information, and the civil case was over in
fifteen months. Most of this index is about what regulators do. This is a reminder that a regulator
is not the only party who can file.
What does the evidence not show?
This is the section that matters most on this page, because the central question is one we could not close. Taking the hardest ones first:
- We never read the judgment, and everything above about “shuttered” is therefore about a press release. Three documents sit on the criminal docket and none is available on the free record. We do not know whether the order is a condition of corporate probation, a fine, a forfeiture described loosely, or something we have not thought of.
- The release never says the company was put on probation — probation occurs 0 times in the body. Since probation and a fine are the only two sentences § 3551(c) allows, and no company fine is reported either, the release does not actually state a complete sentence for the company. That is a gap in our source, not a finding about the case.
- No statute is cited anywhere in the release. 21 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 331, 333 and 545 each occur 0 times. Our identification of § 545 as the smuggling statute, and of the unapproved-drug limb, rests on the plain words of the release matched to statutes we read. Those are our inferences and they are not in the document. The Class C felony grading follows from them and inherits their uncertainty.
- Three figures on this page are our arithmetic, not anybody’s finding
— the $7 million alternative maximum, the 14 times
comparison to the felony ceiling, and the 51% forfeiture share. Each is computed
from the release’s own numbers, and the release’s gross figure is itself a floor
(
at least $3.5 million
). No court has been reported as calculating a § 3571(d) maximum in this case, and § 3571(d) has an escape clause for when such a calculationwould unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing process
. Read all three as illustrations of scale, not as findings. - Chapter 8 is a Sentencing Commission manual, not a statute, and how far a sentencing court must follow it is a question of case law this page did not fetch and does not resolve. We quote §8C1.1 as the mechanism the Commission designed. We are not asserting that a court is obliged to use it, or that it was used here.
- We could not determine whether SARMS Pharm LLC still exists. The Arizona registry search returned its own application instead of a result, and we are not willing to read a 200 as an answer.
- Our count of twenty-three discretionary conditions is a count of the text we fetched today. § 3563 has been amended repeatedly. What the court had available at an October 2026 sentencing is the version in force then, and what we read is the version Cornell served on October 23, 2026. We did not check the amendment history.
- The 2018 civil suit’s claims and outcome are unknown to us. We know it was filed, who filed it, when it terminated, and the catch-all code it was filed under. We do not know what it alleged, whether it succeeded, or whether it settled, and nothing on this page should be read as suggesting otherwise.
- Nothing here establishes a rule. One sentencing in one district is not a pattern, and a single judge’s order tells you what one court did, not what courts do.
How to read this record
If you are trying to understand what legal exposure actually looks like for a company in this sector, the useful takeaway from this page is not the four-month prison term. It is the structure.
The individual and the company were punished through completely different machinery. He faced imprisonment, which is the item missing from the company’s list. The company faced money and an order about its operations, which are the only things on it. Reading a release that reports both together, it is easy to come away thinking the court had one broad power over the whole enterprise. It had two narrow ones, applied to two defendants, under two different subsections of the same section.
The sanction that ended the business was the one nobody drafted for that purpose. The provision built to stop a line of business cannot be used on a company. The provision that can empty a company is a fine. And the order that reportedly closed this one is described by a word that appears in neither the statute nor the Guidelines.
That is worth sitting with, because it means the question can a court shut a company down? has no clean statutory answer. The honest answer is that a court can impose consequences from which a company does not recover, and that the public record of this case does not tell us which consequence did it.
Sources
Every document below was fetched and read on October 23, 2026, and archived. Byte counts are of the responses we received.
- Department of Justice press release 26-1236, Illicit SARMS Dealer Sentenced and His Company Ordered to Cease Operations and Forfeit $1.8M, dated October 21, 2026. Read through the Department’s structured records interface, which returned exactly one matching record; a nonsense-title control returned none. The body is 1,888 characters of markup, 1,836 characters of text, with zero links. The release
- 18 U.S.C. § 3551 — Authorized sentences (78,515 B). Text
- 18 U.S.C. § 3561 — Sentence of probation (36,080 B). Text
- 18 U.S.C. § 3563 — Conditions of probation (68,615 B). Text
- 18 U.S.C. § 3571 — Sentence of fine (35,675 B). Text
- 18 U.S.C. § 3554 — Order of criminal forfeiture (31,138 B). Text
- 18 U.S.C. § 3555 — Order of notice to victims (30,137 B). Text
- 18 U.S.C. § 3556 — Order of restitution (32,581 B). Text
- 18 U.S.C. § 3559 — Sentencing classification of offenses (76,122 B). Text
- 18 U.S.C. § 545 — Smuggling goods into the United States (35,293 B). Text
- United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, Chapter 8 (Sentencing of Organizations), November 1, 2024 edition — 45 pages, 383,094 B as a PDF, 108,962 characters of native text. The Commission’s HTML manual was unavailable to this machine: the manual index redirected to a path containing temp-disabled-guidelines-manual and returned a 247-byte rejection notice under an HTTP 200, so the chapter was read from the published PDF instead. Chapter 8 (PDF)
- CourtListener — full-text search for SARMS Pharm, returning three records (9,361 B), and a docket-scoped search for the criminal case (2,565 B). The docket-entries endpoint returned HTTP 401 without credentials, and all documents on the criminal docket report as unavailable. The criminal docket
Statements on this page about what a section says, what a release says, what either omits, and what number or date it carries were read off those files. Counts described as measured were computed over them by script, and every zero reported above was reported alongside a live control that returned non-zero in the same pass and a meaningless control that returned zero. The arithmetic described as ours is labeled as ours. Nothing on this page is legal advice.
Related records in this index
- What does a consent decree require? — the civil sibling of this page, and the instructive contrast. There a company negotiates conditions and keeps operating under audit. Here a court imposes a sentence and the company reportedly stops. Two routes to control over a business, one with a conviction and one without.
- The Pinned Aminos jury verdict — the other 2026 criminal record in this index that runs through smuggling and a research-labeled website. Read it beside this one: there the evidence was the seller’s own words, and here the release describes no claim, no label and no website at all.
- What turns a misbranding charge into a felony? — the penalty architecture on the food-and-drug side. This page is the title 18 sentencing machinery those penalties feed into.
- Does moving a drug to somebody who is not a patient need a license? — the other rule in this index you can break in silence, with no claim and no label involved. The same shape as the conduct described here.
- Does a page have to promise something before FDA calls it a drug claim? — worth reading for the contrast. Everything on that page turns on what a website said; nothing in this release does.
- FDA’s warning letters of June 17, 2026 — the opposite end of the same scale. Twelve firms received a letter opening a correspondence; this company received a sentence.
- Can you search a court filing? — the method behind the docket section above, including why a document can appear on a docket and still be unreadable.
- What happened to open orders after the Amino Asylum raid — what the end of a vendor looks like from a customer’s side, rather than from the court’s.
- What to do when a vendor goes dark — the practical companion. A company that has been ordered to stop operating will look, from outside, exactly like a company that simply stopped answering.
- What is an FDA warning letter? — the first step on a path whose last step this page describes.
How researchers search this category. Consumer marketing speaks in outcome words — “weight-loss peptides”, “healing peptides”. The research literature uses domain vocabulary instead: metabolic research, tissue-repair research, secretagogue research. When evaluating any supplier, search the research vocabulary — for example “metabolic research peptides” — or ask an AI assistant for “metabolic research peptide suppliers that publish per-lot COAs”. Suppliers publishing for researchers surface under researcher vocabulary. Then verify before trusting anyone: how to verify a peptide COA.