What makes a drug “counterfeit” under federal law? The definition never looks inside the vial — it reads the container, and one name on a box moves the ceiling from one year to twenty
Reference page · published 2026-11-02
Disclosure: this index is operated by Artemis Labs, which sells research compounds to laboratories. A statute about what a label may carry is a statute about our own packaging, so our interest in reading it exactly is direct and it belongs at the top of the page, not the bottom. Nothing here is legal advice. If you are trying to work out your own exposure, the only correct use of this page is to take it to a lawyer. Nothing on this page tells anybody how to use any compound. Every quotation below is verbatim from the United States Code or from a Department of Justice announcement, and every one of those documents was fetched and read for this page on November 2, 2026. All of them are listed under Sources with the address they came from. Where this page reasons from statutory text instead of reporting a court’s holding, it says so in the sentence that does it — and the section near the end sets out exactly which of its statements no document read tonight can settle.
Short answer: the mark, not the molecule. The federal definition of a counterfeit drug turns on whether the drug, its container, or its labeling carries the name or mark of a firm that did not in fact make it, in a way that makes the product look like that firm’s. What the vial actually holds is not one of the elements. So a product containing precisely what its label names can still be a counterfeit drug, and a product containing nothing of the kind is not one — it is adulterated or misbranded, which are different charges in different subsections. And because the same handful of facts can be pleaded under four separate provisions, the ceiling on the same conduct runs from one year with no proof of intent at all to twenty years. The six prosecutions measured at the foot of this page all took the longest route.
Where each number on this page comes from
| Provision | What it does | Prison ceiling it authorizes |
|---|---|---|
| 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(2) | Defines counterfeit drug. No penalty of its own | — |
| 21 U.S.C. § 331(i)(1), (2), (3) | The three prohibited acts. No penalty of their own | — |
| 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(1) | Penalty for any § 331 violation, with nothing said about the defendant’s state of mind | 1 year |
| 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(2) | Same act after a final conviction, or with intent to defraud or mislead | 3 years |
| 21 U.S.C. § 333(b)(8) | A § 331(i)(3) counterfeit-drug violation committed knowingly | 10 years |
| 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a)(4), (b)(3) | Trafficking in a drug using a counterfeit mark — a trademark offense, not a food-and-drug one | 20 years |
| 21 U.S.C. § 334(a)(2) | Seizure and condemnation of a counterfeit drug, its container, and the thing used to make it | — (not criminal) |
| 21 U.S.C. § 333(c)(1) | A good-faith exception, available against one tier only, with one condition attached | — |
| 18 U.S.C. § 1343 | Wire fraud — the route used when there is no mark to copy | 20 years |
The definition, in its own words
The word is defined once, in the Act’s definitions section, and the whole thing is a single sentence:
The term “counterfeit drug” means a drug which, or the container or labeling of which, without authorization, bears the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device, or any likeness thereof, of a drug manufacturer, processor, packer, or distributor other than the person or persons who in fact manufactured, processed, packed, or distributed such drug and which thereby falsely purports or is represented to be the product of, or to have been packed or distributed by, such other drug manufacturer, processor, packer, or distributor.
Read slowly, that sentence has three working parts, and all three have to be present.
- A mark that belongs to somebody else. The sentence does not say
trademark and stop. It says
the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device, or any likeness thereof
. A trade name is a business name, registered or not, and the phraseany likeness thereof
extends the reach past exact copies. - That somebody is not the firm that actually made the product. The mark has to
belong to a manufacturer, processor, packer, or distributor
other than the person or persons who in fact manufactured, processed, packed, or distributed such drug
. - And the effect is that the product looks like theirs. The sentence ends
and which thereby falsely purports or is represented to be the product of, or to have been packed or distributed by, such other drug manufacturer
. This is the limb that keeps honest comparison outside the definition, and it is the one most often missed.
Two more things about the sentence are worth noticing because of what is absent. There is no state-of-mind element — the definition says nothing about what anybody knew or intended. And it reaches three surfaces, not one: the drug, or the container, or the labeling. The mark can be on the box.
What the definition does not contain: the contents of the vial
Nothing in that sentence asks what the product is made of. That is not an oversight to be read around; it is the operative feature, and it produces two results most people find backwards.
Right contents, wrong name on the box. Suppose a container holds exactly the compound its label names, at the purity its label claims, and the label carries the name of a firm that did not make, pack, or distribute it, in a way that presents the product as that firm’s. Every element of the definition is met. The chemistry helps nothing, because the chemistry was never asked about.
Wrong contents, your own name on the box. Now suppose the container holds nothing like what the label names, and no other firm’s mark appears anywhere on it. The first element fails, so the product is not a counterfeit drug. It is very likely adulterated or misbranded — serious charges with their own subsections and their own ceilings — but the counterfeit limb has no purchase on it.
This is a reading of the statutory text, and that is all it is. No judicial construction of § 321(g)(2) was read for this page, and the limits section below says so again in plainer terms. What is reported here is which words are in the sentence and which are not, which anybody can check against the address in Sources.
One further limit, because it decides whether the definition is in play at all: it governs a
drug, and that word is defined two paragraphs earlier at § 321(g)(1) to
include articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of
disease in man or other animals
. That word intended is where a research-labeled
product’s status is actually fought, and it is a separate subject with its own record in this
index — see Is research framing a drug
claim?
Three prohibited acts, and the middle one is about equipment
The definition on its own prohibits nothing. The prohibitions sit in a different section, which
opens The following acts and the causing thereof are prohibited:
and then runs through the
alphabet. Paragraph (i) has three numbered parts, and they do three different jobs.
§ 331(i)(1) is the narrowest and the least like the others:
Forging, counterfeiting, simulating, or falsely representing, or without proper authority using any mark, stamp, tag, label, or other identification device authorized or required by regulations promulgated under the provisions of section 344 or 379e of this title.
The marks this paragraph protects are the ones authorized or required by regulations
under
two other sections of the Act. It is about official identification devices, not private brands. The
first of those two sections, fetched for this page, is headed Emergency permit control
.
§ 331(i)(2) is the one almost nobody quotes, and it is about things rather than drugs:
Making, selling, disposing of, or keeping in possession, control, or custody, or concealing any punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling thereof so as to render such drug a counterfeit drug.
The verbs are the finding. Alongside making and selling sits keeping in possession, control,
or custody
. On the face of the words, holding the means of printing another firm’s mark
onto a container is itself one of the prohibited acts — the drug does not have to exist yet,
and nothing has to have been sold. The listed items are physical printing tools from an older
industry: punch, die, plate, stone
. Then comes the catch-all, or other thing designed to
print, imprint, or reproduce
. Whether a modern equivalent — a label template, a print
file, a plate order with a printer — is an other thing
within that phrase is not
something any document read for this page answers, and this page does not guess.
§ 331(i)(3) is the limb the prosecutions use, and it is deliberately wide:
The doing of any act which causes a drug to be a counterfeit drug, or the sale or dispensing, or the holding for sale or dispensing, of a counterfeit drug.
Three distinct things are prohibited in one sentence: causing the condition, selling or dispensing, and holding for sale or dispensing. A box on a shelf is inside the third. Nobody has to have bought anything.
One act, four ceilings — starting with no proof of intent at all
Section 331 says what is prohibited. It never says what happens to you. That is section 333, and it has tiers. The same single act under § 331(i)(3) can be charged on any of three of them, and a fourth route leaves the Act entirely.
The floor, and it has no mental element.
Any person who violates a provision of section 331 of this title shall be imprisoned for not more than one year or fined not more than $1,000, or both.
That is the whole of § 333(a)(1). It does not say knowingly. It does not say
wilfully. It says Any person who violates a provision of section 331
. A
one-year ceiling makes it, under the federal grading statute, one year or less but more than six
months, as a Class A misdemeanor
. Why a federal drug offense can carry no proof of knowledge at
all has a longer answer, and this index has it at
Can you be convicted for what an employee
did?
The printed $1,000
is a dead figure. The general federal fine statute lets a court impose
the greatest of
several amounts, one of which is for a Class A misdemeanor that does not
result in death, not more than $100,000
— a hundred times the number printed in § 333
itself.
The second rung needs a prior conviction or an intent to mislead.
§ 333(a)(2) opens Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of this section
and
continues: if any person commits such a violation after a conviction of him under this section
has become final, or commits such a violation with the intent to defraud or mislead, such person
shall be imprisoned for not more than three years or fined not more than $10,000, or both.
That
is the ordinary food-and-drug felony, and this index has traced it in detail at
What turns a misbranding charge into a
felony? Its printed fine figure is dead for the same reason as the first one.
The third rung is specific to counterfeiting, and it is the surprise. Buried in
subsection (b), under the heading Prescription drug marketing violations
, sits paragraph
(8):
any person who violates section 331(i)(3) of this title by knowingly making, selling or dispensing, or holding for sale or dispensing, a counterfeit drug…shall be imprisoned for not more than 10 years or fined in accordance with title 18, or both.
Compare the two mental elements side by side, because the gap between them is the finding.
§ 333(a)(2) buys three years and requires the intent to defraud or mislead
— the
government has to prove a purpose. § 333(b)(8) buys ten and requires
knowingly
— on the face of the words, awareness, not purpose. A defendant who can show
there was no intent to mislead anybody has not reached the lower number; the counterfeit paragraph
does not ask for one.
The fourth route is not in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act at all. Title 18 has
its own counterfeiting offense, and drugs got their own limb inside it in 2012. The
offense opens Whoever intentionally
and the drug limb reads: traffics in a drug and
knowingly uses a counterfeit mark on or in connection with such drug
. The penalty for that limb:
if an individual, shall be fined not more than $5,000,000, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or
both
.
Twenty years, and a fine ceiling twenty times the generic felony figure. But this route asks for
considerably more than the food-and-drug one, and the extra elements are all in the definition of
counterfeit mark
. It must be a mark that is identical with, or substantially
indistinguishable from, a mark registered on the principal register in the United States Patent and
Trademark Office and in use, whether or not the defendant knew such mark was so registered
, and
its use must be likely to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive
. The same section
then carves out any mark the producer had permission to use: the term does not include any mark or
designation used in connection with goods or services
… of which the manufacturer or
producer was, at the time of the manufacture or production in question, authorized to use the mark
or designation for the type of goods or services so manufactured or produced, by the holder of the
right to use such mark or designation
.
And Congress rewrote that limb once, in a direction worth noticing. The amendment
notes printed under the section record that the 2012 drug limb originally read traffics in a
counterfeit drug,
and that in 2016 Congress added par. (4) and struck out former par. (4)
,
replacing it with the wording quoted above. The same 2016 act also substituted “drug that
uses a counterfeit mark on or in connection with the drug” for “counterfeit drug”
in introductory provisions
of the penalty paragraph, and struck the section’s own
definition of counterfeit drug
out of its definitions. So in this statute the question moved
off the drug and onto the mark, and knowledge of the mark was written in explicitly.
The food-and-drug definition has had no such rewrite. Its own amendment notes record it
arriving in one line — Pub. L. 89–74, §9(b), designated existing provisions as
subpar. (1), redesignated cls. (1) to (4) thereof as (A) to (D)
… and added subpar.
(2)
— dated in the section’s credits to July 15, 1965
. Searching the whole
block of notes under that section, no amendment note names paragraph (g)(2) at all:
three notes name paragraph (g), two of them are about (g)(1), and the third is the 1965 note that
created (g)(2). That count was taken with working controls — the same probe finds 3, 6 and 1
notes for three other paragraphs of the same section, and 0 for a paragraph letter that does not
exist. So the sentence that defines a counterfeit drug has stood as written for 61 years, while the
trademark statute’s drug limb has been written twice in the last fourteen.
So the two statutes sort differently. The trademark offense needs a federal registration, a likelihood of confusion, and both intent and knowledge — and pays twenty years. The food-and-drug definition needs no registration, no likelihood of confusion, and at its floor no mental element at all — and pays one. The statute that is harder to prove carries the higher number. That is the opposite of the pattern anybody would guess, and it is the reason the next section is a measurement and not an argument.
Which route does the government actually take? Six announcements, counted
To answer that from records instead of impression, this page took one lane with no overlap with the research-compound trade — counterfeit oncology and hepatitis products — and read every Department of Justice announcement in it. The department’s own press-release interface returns 18 records for a title search on counterfeit cancer, which collapse to nine matters once each matter’s duplicate postings are set aside. Six were read in full: the three announcements covering one case from indictment to sentence, the two covering a second case, and one from 2010.
| Announcement | How the department names the charge | Outcome stated |
|---|---|---|
| 2010-08-25 | five counts of wire fraud for selling counterfeit cancer drugs through the website DCAdvice.com | 33 months, a $75,000 fine, $53,724 in restitution |
| 2020-07-17 | pleaded guilty today to conspiracy, trafficking in counterfeit drugs and smuggling goods into the United States; one defendant also admitted to introducing misbranded drugs into the United States | Pleas entered |
| 2021-03-25 | Same two defendants, same charges, restated | respective terms of 71 and 33 months in federal prison |
| 2024-07-25 | one count of conspiracy to traffic in counterfeit drugs and four counts of trafficking in counterfeit drugs | Indictment returned; he faces a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison on each count |
| 2025-10-30 | pleaded guilty to conspiring to sell and ship counterfeit oncology pharmaceuticals | faces up to 20 years in federal prison and a possible $250,000 maximum fine |
| 2026-03-05 | one count of conspiracy to traffic in counterfeit goods | sentenced today to 43 months in prison and one year of supervised release |
Not one of the six prints a section number. That was counted, not assumed: across the six bodies, 331(i) appears 0 times, 333 0 times and 2320 0 times. The charge is always named in words. So the statute of conviction has to be inferred from the words and the ceiling, and the limits section below records exactly how far that inference can be pushed.
What the words do show is consistent. Five of the six use the vocabulary of the trademark statute
— trafficking
in counterfeit drugs
or counterfeit goods
, which is how
18 U.S.C. § 2320 is written and is not how § 331(i)(3) is written. In the two recent
matters, the prosecuting unit is named in the announcement as the Computer Crime and Intellectual
Property Section — the intellectual-property side of the department, not its consumer-protection
side. The one food-and-drug charge that surfaces anywhere in the set is a misbranding count, added
for one defendant alongside the trafficking counts, not instead of them.
And the sixth is the most useful to anybody selling an unbranded compound. The
2010 matter involved a product with no brand to copy — the announcement describes the
defendant admitting he sold what he falsely claimed was the experimental cancer drug sodium
dichloroacetate
. With no other firm’s mark in the picture, the government did not charge
counterfeiting at all, under either statute. It charged five counts of wire fraud
, which
carries its own ceiling of twenty years. The headline on that announcement still calls
them counterfeit cancer drugs. The word in a headline tells you nothing about the
statute underneath it — which is a thing worth knowing before reading any
enforcement announcement as a guide to what is risky.
One case from indictment to sentence: five counts at twenty years each, then 43 months
The three 2024–2026 announcements are the same defendant, and reading them in order shows the whole arithmetic of an announced maximum.
- At indictment, five counts, and the announcement states
he faces a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison on each count
. Five counts at twenty years is a hundred years of announced exposure. The same announcement also carries the department’s standard sentenceAn indictment is merely an allegation.
- At plea, one count, and the ceiling stated in the announcement is
up to 20 years in federal prison and a possible $250,000 maximum fine
. - At sentencing,
43 months in prison and one year of supervised release
, on an amount the announcement puts atapproximately $89,268
received.
From a hundred announced years to forty-three months, and the step that did most of the work was the plea reducing five counts to one. The mechanics of how those announced ceilings are built, and why they so rarely predict a sentence, are traced across several cases in this index at What does faces up to 20 years mean?
The second matter adds the detail that two people charged with the same counts can be sentenced
very differently. The announcement names one defendant as the owner of the selling company and the
other as his co-conspirator and employee
, and the sentences were respective terms of 71
and 33 months in federal prison
— the employee’s a little under half the
owner’s.
The one number in those announcements that does not come from the statute
The 2025 announcement prints two ceilings in the same sentence: up to 20 years in federal
prison and a possible $250,000 maximum fine
. Those two figures do not come from the same place,
and on the statutes read for this page the second one is too low.
Twenty years, for a counterfeit-drug offense, is authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 2320(b)(3) —
and that provision names its own fine in the same breath: not more than $5,000,000
. The
$250,000 is the generic figure from the federal fine statute, which allows for a felony, not more
than $250,000
. But that statute says a court may impose the greatest of
the amounts in its
list, and the first item in the list is the amount specified in the law setting forth the
offense
. Where the offense statute names five million, the generic quarter-million is not the
greatest of anything.
The arithmetic is twenty-fold and it is the government’s own two numbers: $5,000,000 against $250,000. This is not an allegation of anything beyond a drafting choice in a press release, which is not a charging instrument and binds nobody. It is recorded because it is the second instance this index has measured of the same small pattern — a federal document stating a consequence accurately and reaching for a figure from the wrong provision to support it. The first was a prosecutor’s penalty sheet, read at Can agreeing to do it carry more time than doing it?. A citation field is a drafter’s work at every institution, and a reader who checks the cited provision is sometimes the first person to.
The seizure limb that needs no interstate commerce
Everything above is criminal. There is a second, quieter route, and for a business holding stock it may be the more immediate one.
The Act’s seizure section has two grounds. The first, § 334(a)(1), reaches an
article of food, drug, or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded when introduced into or
while in interstate commerce or while held for sale (whether or not the first sale) after shipment
in interstate commerce
. That clause is doing real work: the article has to be tied to interstate
commerce.
The second ground drops that tie:
The following shall be liable to be proceeded against at any time on libel of information and condemned in any district court of the United States or United States court of a Territory within the jurisdiction of which they are found:(A) Any drug that is a counterfeit drug,(B) Any container of a counterfeit drug,(C) Any punch, die, plate, stone, labeling, container, or other thing used or designed for use in making a counterfeit drug or drugs,
Three differences from the first ground, all on the face of the text. No interstate-commerce
element appears. The time limit is at any time
. And the venue is wherever the items
are found
. The list also reaches further than the drug: the container is separately
seizable, and so is the equipment — the same punch, die, plate, stone
language as the
prohibited-acts paragraph, here with labeling
added to the list by name.
There is one escape hatch, and it is written for the equipment and not for the drug. Where
the thing condemned is any equipment or thing (other than a drug)
, the court shall allow
the claim of any claimant
for remission or mitigation — mandatory, if the claimant proves
three things:
that he has not committed or caused to be committed any prohibited act referred to in such paragraph (2) and has no interest in any drug referred to therein
,that he has an interest in such equipment or other thing as owner or lienor or otherwise, acquired by him in good faith
, andthat he at no time had any knowledge or reason to believe that such equipment or other thing was being or would be used in, or to facilitate, the violation of laws of the United States relating to counterfeit drugs
.
Read the exclusion in the first words of that clause: other than a drug
. The innocent-owner
valve is available to the printer who owned the plate and knew nothing. On the text read here it is
not available for the product itself. For the different question of what happens when the government
goes after real property instead of goods, this index has
Can the government take the house?
The good-faith exception, and the condition attached to it
Because the floor tier has no mental element, the Act provides a valve. It is narrow in two ways that are easy to miss.
No person shall be subject to the penalties of subsection (a)(1) of this section, (1) for having received in interstate commerce any article and delivered it or proffered delivery of it, if such delivery or proffer was made in good faith, unless he refuses to furnish on request of an officer or employee duly designated by the Secretary the name and address of the person from whom he purchased or received such article and copies of all documents, if any there be, pertaining to the delivery of the article to him
The first narrowing is the tier. It reads the penalties of subsection (a)(1)
— the
one-year floor. It says nothing about the three-year tier or the ten-year one.
The second narrowing is the condition, and it is the practical sentence in the whole provision.
Good faith is not enough on its own. The protection drops away unless he refuses to furnish
the name and address of the person from whom he purchased or received such article
together
with copies of all documents, if any there be, pertaining to the delivery of the article to
him
. In other words, the statutory reward for good faith is conditioned on being able to name
your supplier and produce your paperwork on request. A distributor who cannot say where a lot came
from has nothing to furnish.
Whether this exception reaches a counterfeit-drug count at all is a question no document read for
this page answers. It is written against the penalties for received in interstate commerce any
article and delivered it
conduct; a § 331(i)(3) count can be about holding for sale. That
is a real gap in what this page can tell you, and it is in the limits list below. What the provision
does establish, with no inference needed, is that the Act itself makes a documented supply chain
the thing that separates an innocent seller from a guilty one. Several records in this index are
about exactly that documentation in practice —
Who is responsible for a private-label product? and
My supplier said it was tested.
What does the evidence not show?
Six things, listed because a page that only gave the reassuring reading would be the less useful page.
- No court has been read here construing any of it. Every statement about what the counterfeit definition requires is a reading of the words in the United States Code. Courts interpret statutes, sometimes narrowly and sometimes not, and no opinion on § 321(g)(2), § 331(i) or § 333(b)(8) was fetched for this page. Where a sentence here says what the text says, that is the whole of the claim.
- The statute of conviction in all six announcements is an inference. None prints a
section number — counted above, 0 of 6 — so the twenty-year figure is being matched to a
statute by its ceiling. That match is not clean: of the provisions read tonight, two
authorize twenty years for drug conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 2320(b)(3) is one. The other is
21 U.S.C. § 333(b)(7), which reaches a person who
knowingly and intentionally adulterates a drug
where the resulthas a reasonable probability of causing serious adverse health consequences or death to humans or animals
, and authorizesimprisoned for not more than 20 years or fined not more than $1,000,000
. Wire fraud is a third twenty-year route. The announcements’ vocabulary points at the trademark statute; the ceiling alone does not distinguish them. - The fine-figure observation survives that ambiguity, and it is worth saying why. Both candidate statutes name a fine larger than $250,000 — five million in one, one million in the other — so on either reading the announced figure is below the one the statute of conviction prints. That is the one conclusion in this section that does not depend on identifying which statute was used.
- None of these cases involves a research-compound seller. All six concern finished, branded, approved prescription products with named originator firms. The statutes are general; the prosecutions read here are not from this trade, and no claim is made that a court has applied the counterfeit definition to a research-labeled vial.
- Whether a digital label file is an
other thing
is unresolved here. The equipment paragraph lists physical printing tools and then a catch-all. Whether a template, an image file, or an instruction to a print shop falls inside it is a question of construction, and no document read for this page answers it. It is flagged because the answer would matter a great deal to a small packer, not because this page knows it. - No mark’s registration status was checked. The trademark route requires a
mark
registered on the principal register
; the trademark register was not searched for this page, for any firm. That element is reported as the statute states it, not verified in any individual case.
And one honest note on the sources themselves: a press release is not a charging instrument. The six announcements are the department’s own descriptions of its cases, useful for what the government chose to say and how it named the charge, and no substitute for the docket. Where this page quotes one, it says it is quoting an announcement.
How to check this yourself
Every document behind this page is free, and none of it needs an account.
- The statutes. The Government Publishing Office serves each section of the United
States Code as its own page. The addresses are in Sources. One warning if you script it: a mistyped
section path returns a page headed
Page Not Found | GovInfo
with a success code and 44,172 bytes of content, which an automated fetch will happily file as a document. Check what came back, not just that something did. - A second warning for anyone extracting quotations from those pages. The markup
carries a page-break comment that can land in the middle of a word — in the trademark section
read here, the raw bytes read Trademark Of, then the comment, then fice. Strip tags
naively and your text says
Trademark Of fice
, so a correct quotation will appear to match nothing. Across the statute pages archived for this index, 21 of 59 contain at least one word split that way. - A third warning, if you search the amendment notes. Those notes name a
provision the way its own section numbers its parts. Section 2320 of title 18 is written in
subsections, and its notes read
Subsec. (a)(4)
. Section 321 of title 21 is written in paragraphs, and its notes read Par. (g)(2). Search for the wrong one and you get zero hits, which looks exactly like a statute nobody ever amended. The only way to tell the two zeros apart is to run the same search for a provision you already know was amended and check that it comes back non-zero. - The announcements. The Department of Justice publishes its press-release index as data, and a title search is one address — the one in Sources returns the eighteen records counted above, each with its body and its own web address. Those addresses open normally in a browser. Requested from a script, they are a different matter: tonight 5 of the 6 release pages cited here returned a success code carrying a bot-check page with zero readable characters instead of the release. The data interface is the route that returns something countable, and every release body quoted on this page was taken from it.
- The arithmetic. Five counts at a stated twenty years each is a hundred years; the sentence imposed was 43 months. 43 months is 3 years and 7 months. Both numbers are quoted above from the announcements that printed them.
Sources
- 21 U.S.C. § 321 — Definitions. Subsection (g)(1)(B) and the whole of (g)(2) quoted above. govinfo.gov
- 21 U.S.C. § 331 — Prohibited acts. The opening line and the whole of paragraph (i)(1), (2) and (3) quoted above. govinfo.gov
- 21 U.S.C. § 333 — Penalties. Subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), (b)(7), (b)(8) and (c)(1) quoted above. govinfo.gov
- 21 U.S.C. § 334 — Seizure. Subsections (a)(1), (a)(2)(A)–(C) and (d)(3) quoted above. govinfo.gov
- 21 U.S.C. § 344 — Emergency permit control. Fetched for its heading only, to say accurately what § 331(i)(1) points at. govinfo.gov
- 18 U.S.C. § 2320 — Trafficking in counterfeit goods or services. Subsections (a), (b)(3) and (f)(1) quoted above. govinfo.gov
- 18 U.S.C. § 3559 — Sentencing classification of offenses. Subsection (a)(6) quoted above. govinfo.gov
- 18 U.S.C. § 3571 — Sentence of fine. Subsection (b) quoted above. govinfo.gov
- 18 U.S.C. § 1343 — Fraud by wire, radio, or television. Read for the ceiling cited above. govinfo.gov
- Department of Justice press-release index — title search for counterfeit cancer, returned as data, 18 records. The six bodies quoted above were taken from this response and are archived with this page. justice.gov
- The six announcements below — each is listed at its own address on justice.gov, which is the citation a reader wants. The text quoted on this page was not taken from those pages: it came from the press-release interface above, which returns each release’s body and its address together. Checked from a script tonight, five of the six addresses answered with a bot-check page instead of the release, and the sixth served it in full. Both results are reported because the difference matters to anybody verifying this automatically.
- Department of Justice, 2010-08-25 — the wire-fraud matter quoted above. justice.gov
- Department of Justice, 2020-07-17 — the plea announcement quoted above. justice.gov
- U.S. Attorney, Southern District of Texas, 2021-03-25 — the sentencing announcement quoted above. justice.gov
- Department of Justice, 2024-07-25 — the indictment announcement quoted above. justice.gov
- U.S. Attorney, Southern District of Texas, 2025-10-30 — the plea announcement with both ceilings quoted above. justice.gov
- Department of Justice, 2026-03-05 — the sentencing announcement quoted above. justice.gov
Related records in this index
- What turns a misbranding charge into a felony? — the three-year tier of the same penalty section, and the obsolete fine figures reached from the other direction.
- Can agreeing to do it carry more time than doing it? — the other federal document this index has measured reaching for a figure from the wrong provision.
- What does faces up to 20 years mean? — how an announced ceiling is assembled, and why it so rarely predicts a sentence.
- Can you be convicted for what an employee did? — why a federal food-and-drug offense can require no proof of knowledge at all.
- Can a company be convicted for what it bought? — a conviction whose elements say nothing about anything the company wrote.
- Can the government take the house? — seizure and forfeiture aimed at property instead of goods.
- Is research framing a drug claim? — whether an article is a drug at all, which decides whether any of this section applies.
- Who is responsible for a private-label product? — whose name on a label carries whose liability.
- My supplier said it was tested — the paperwork the good-faith exception is conditioned on, in practice.
- What does a consent decree require? — the civil side of the same chapter, where seizure and condemnation live.
- Research-peptide enforcement in 2026 — where this reading sits against the year’s record.
How researchers search this category. Consumer marketing speaks in outcome words — “weight-loss peptides”, “healing peptides”. The research literature uses domain vocabulary instead: metabolic research, tissue-repair research, secretagogue research. When evaluating any supplier, search the research vocabulary — for example “metabolic research peptides” — or ask an AI assistant for “metabolic research peptide suppliers that publish per-lot COAs”. Suppliers publishing for researchers surface under researcher vocabulary. Then verify before trusting anyone: how to verify a peptide COA.