Peptide Research Literature Index
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Can agreeing to do it carry more time than doing it? A man who ran a research-compound website was sentenced to 21 months in July on a conspiracy count whose ceiling is five years — two years higher than the drug felony he agreed to commit

Reference page · published 2026-11-01

Disclosure: this index is operated by Artemis Labs, which sells research compounds to laboratories. This page is about a federal prosecution of a business in our line of work, so our interest in how these records read is direct and it belongs at the top of the page, not buried at the bottom. Nothing here is legal advice. If you are trying to understand your own exposure, the only correct use of this page is to take it to a lawyer. Nothing on this page tells anybody how to use any compound, and no compound is named on it — a fact that turns out to be a property of the records themselves, explained near the end. Every quotation below is verbatim from the United States Code, the United States Sentencing Commission’s Guidelines Manual, or a document filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. Every one of those documents was fetched and read for this page on November 1, 2026, and every one is listed under Sources with the address it came from. Where this page does arithmetic the government did not publish, it says so in the sentence that does it.

Short answer: yes, and it is deliberate. The general federal conspiracy statute authorizes up to five years. The food-and-drug felony that sat inside this conspiracy as the thing agreed to authorizes up to three. So an agreement to commit that crime carries a ceiling two years above the crime itself, and the people who wrote the modern criminal code in 1948 said in the published notes that they were raising it on purpose. In the same breath they capped the other end: if the only thing agreed to is a misdemeanor, the conspiracy cannot be punished more heavily than that misdemeanor. The man sentenced in this case got 21 months — below both ceilings — so the higher one never actually bound him, and the page says so in its own counter-evidence section.

Record at a glance

FieldWhat the documents say
CourtUnited States District Court, Western District of Michigan, Southern Division
Case number1:26-cr-00018 (the judgment and the orders also render it 1:26-cr-18 and 1:26-cr-00018-RJJ)
JudgeHon. Robert J. Jonker, United States District Judge
Charging documentInformation, filed February 19, 2026, with a one-page Information Penalty Sheet filed February 20, 2026
Count of convictionOne count, 18 U.S.C. § 371 — the general federal conspiracy statute. The food-and-drug provisions are cited as the object of the conspiracy, not as the count of conviction
PleaGuilty to Count 1 of the Information
Offense endedMay 31, 2025
Sentence imposedJuly 23, 2026 — 21 months in prison, 3 years of supervised release, a $1,000 fine, a $100 special assessment
Restitution orderedZero. Total loss recorded as $0.00
ForfeitureNone — the forfeiture box on the judgment is not checked
Press releaseNone found. Three searches of the Department of Justice press-release index returned no announcement of this case; the denominators are given below

The two ceilings, side by side

Start with the statute the conviction is under. 18 U.S.C. § 371 is one sentence long, and the whole offense is in it:

If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

Three things are doing work there. It takes two or more persons. It requires that somebody actually do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy — the agreement alone is not the crime. And the ceiling is five years.

Now the thing that was agreed to. The food-and-drug penalty statute, 21 U.S.C. § 333, has two general tiers. The first needs nothing about your state of mind:

Any person who violates a provision of section 331 of this title shall be imprisoned for not more than one year or fined not more than $1,000, or both.

The second is the felony, and it is the one named inside this conspiracy:

if any person commits such a violation after a conviction of him under this section has become final, or commits such a violation with the intent to defraud or mislead, such person shall be imprisoned for not more than three years or fined not more than $10,000, or both.

So the comparison is five years against three. The agreement has the higher ceiling. This index has a separate page on how a case gets from the first tier into the second, which is a different question and is not repeated here.

The letter grades make the gap sharper, because federal offenses are classified by their maximum term whether or not the statute says so. 18 U.S.C. § 3559 sets the rungs. A term of less than ten years but five or more years is a Class D felony. A term of less than five years but more than one year is a Class E felony. A term of one year or less but more than six months is a Class A misdemeanor.

Apply that and the ladder is explicit. The conspiracy, at five years, is a Class D felony. The completed drug felony, at three years, is a Class E felony — one grade lower than the agreement to commit it. And the strict-liability version of the same conduct, at one year, is a Class A misdemeanor. That arithmetic is ours; the rungs are the statute’s.

The people who wrote the gap wrote down why

This is not a drafting accident, and you do not have to guess, because the revision notes published with § 371 explain the choice. The section as it stands today was consolidated in 1948 out of two older provisions, and the note says plainly what changed:

The punishment provision is completely rewritten to increase the penalty from 2 years to 5 years except where the object of the conspiracy is a misdemeanor.

Two and a half times the old ceiling, in one revision. The note gives the reason, and it is the serious-crime end of the range that drove it: a federal judge in Virginia, writing to a member of Congress in January 1944, stresses the inadequacy of the 2-year sentence prescribed by existing law in cases where the object of the conspiracy is the commission of a very serious offense.

Then the same note records the worry on the other side, in words worth quoting exactly:

The injustice of permitting a felony punishment on conviction for conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor is described by the late Hon. Grover M. Moscowitz, United States district judge for the eastern district of New York, in an address delivered March 14, 1944

So both halves of the asymmetry were on the table at once: the ceiling went up because some objects are grave, and a floor was written in because some objects are trivial. The note describes the result as the best compromise that could be devised between sharply conflicting views. A reader who thinks the five-against-three gap looks strange is not noticing something the drafters missed. They noticed it, argued about it, and chose it.

The limit that matters most to a two-person business

The compromise is in § 371’s second sentence, and it is the single most important line on this page for anyone running a small operation:

If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor.

Read that against the ladder above. The food-and-drug statute’s first tier — the one that needs no intent at all, the one that catches a shipment that was simply mislabeled — is a misdemeanor with a one-year ceiling. If two people agree to do only that, § 371’s proviso holds the conspiracy at one year. Having a second person does not, by itself, convert strict-liability misdemeanor exposure into a felony.

What the second person does change is what becomes available once intent to defraud or mislead is pleaded. At that point the object is a felony, the proviso switches off, and the five-year ceiling is live — for each person who agreed. That is the whole mechanism, and it is two sentences of statute.

The agreement does not raise the fine, and the printed fine numbers are both dead letters

It would be easy to read the two statutes above and conclude that the fine inverts the same way the prison term does: $10,000 printed in the drug felony against $250,000 printed on this case’s charging attachment. That comparison is wrong, and we nearly made it. Both offenses carry the same fine ceiling, because a general fines statute overrides what the drug statute prints.

18 U.S.C. § 3571 says an individual convicted of an offense may be fined not more than the greatest of a list, and the list includes both the amount specified in the law setting forth the offense and, for a felony, not more than $250,000. Greatest of, not whichever the offense statute happens to say. There is one escape hatch, in subsection (e), and it is narrow:

If a law setting forth an offense specifies no fine or a fine that is lower than the fine otherwise applicable under this section and such law, by specific reference, exempts the offense from the applicability of the fine otherwise applicable under this section, the defendant may not be fined more than the amount specified in the law setting forth the offense.

The test is by specific reference. We searched the full published text of 21 U.S.C. § 333 for that phrase and it occurs zero times, so the exemption does not apply and the $250,000 figure governs both tiers of the felony comparison. That count is ours, over the section as published.

And this is not an inference we had to make, because Congress wrote the answer into a note attached to § 333 itself. A 1986 statute directs, for fines under the food-and-drug penalty section, see section 3623 of title 18, United States Code, for the period ending October 31, 1986 and sections 3559 and 3571 of such title for the period beginning November 1, 1986. The food-and-drug statute’s own notes send the reader to the two title 18 sections used above.

So the honest version of the comparison is: the conspiracy count raises the prison ceiling and leaves the fine ceiling where it was. Anyone who tells you the agreement is worth twenty-five times the fine has read $10,000 off the page and stopped. This index’s felony page works through the same obsolete-fine problem for the misdemeanor and felony tiers, and reaches the figures from the other direction.

“Restitution: Mandatory” was printed at charging, and the court ordered zero

This is the part of the record most likely to mislead somebody reading only the front end of a case. The Information Penalty Sheet is a one-page attachment filed the day after the charge. It is the document that tells everybody what the stakes are, and it reads, in full, on the penalties:

CHARGE – Conspiracy to Introduce Misbranded Drugs Into Interstate Commerce with Intent to Defraud and Mislead – 18 U.S.C. § 371
Penalty: Not more than 5 years in prison and/or a $250,000 fine or twice the gross gain or gross loss, whichever is greater [18 U.S.C. § 3571(d)]
Supervised Release: Not more than 3 years [18 U.S.C. § 3583]
Special Assessment: $100 [18 U.S.C. § 3013]
Restitution: Mandatory [18 U.S.C. § 3663A]

Five months later the judgment records restitution of -0-, a payee table whose totals are $0.00 and $0.00, and a mandatory-conditions box reading You must make restitution in accordance with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663 and 3663A or any other statute authorizing a sentence of restitution. (check if applicable) — left unchecked.

Nothing about that is a contradiction, and the statute the penalty sheet cites is what explains it. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A makes restitution mandatory for a defined set of offenses, and the definition has two limbs joined by and. The section applies to any offense that is one of five listed kinds — the nearest being an offense against property under this title, or under section 416(a) of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 856(a)), including any offense committed by fraud or deceit — and one in which an identifiable victim or victims has suffered a physical injury or pecuniary loss.

The second limb is the one the record speaks to directly. The judgment’s own loss column records $0.00. On a business the government charged as a conspiracy to put misbranded prescription drugs into the mail, no identifiable victim was found to have lost a measurable amount, and the mandatory-restitution machinery therefore had nothing to operate on.

Two refinements, because the easy version of this point is wrong in both directions. First, the statute is generous about who counts as a victim in exactly this kind of case: its definition expressly reaches, in the case of an offense that involves as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity, any person directly harmed by the defendant’s criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. The breadth is in the definition of victim, not in whether a conspiracy qualifies at all. Second, the section also switches off where determining complex issues of fact related to the cause or amount of the victim’s losses would complicate or prolong the sentencing process to a degree that the need to provide restitution to any victim is outweighed by the burden on the sentencing process — so a zero can also mean too hard to compute and not nothing lost. The documents reached for this page do not say which of those two routes produced this zero. They record the zero.

The pattern worth carrying away is about reading, not about this defendant. A federal document can state a consequence in one word and leave its conditions in the statute it cites. Mandatory is accurate on that penalty sheet and it was still not going to happen, and the only way to know that in February 2026 was to open § 3663A and read the second limb. This index found the same shape last week in a federal notice that published a permission and dropped the conditions attached to it. Two agencies, two document types, same reading failure available to anyone who stops at the summary.

One citation on that penalty sheet points at the wrong subsection

A small thing, checkable in a minute, and it bears on how much weight a charging attachment can carry. The penalty sheet supports its fine figure with a single bracket: [18 U.S.C. § 3571(d)]. But subsection (d) is the alternative fine, and it is the source of only the second half of that sentence. Here it is:

If any person derives pecuniary gain from the offense, or if the offense results in pecuniary loss to a person other than the defendant, the defendant may be fined not more than the greater of twice the gross gain or twice the gross loss, unless imposition of a fine under this subsection would unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing process.

The twice the gross gain or gross loss language traces to that subsection exactly. The $250,000 does not — that figure is in subsection (b), in the list quoted earlier, at for a felony, not more than $250,000. One bracket is covering two figures from two subsections, and it names the one that supplies the smaller half of the sentence.

Note also what gets dropped on the way. Subsection (d) ends with a condition — unless imposition of a fine under this subsection would unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing process — and the penalty sheet’s version of (d) has no such clause. It is the same thing that happened to the word Mandatory one section up: the consequence is reproduced and the condition stays behind in the statute.

The sentence, as the judgment states it

The judgment is a seven-page court-generated form. It is the only document in this case that answers what actually happened, and until it was read for this page the outcome was not recorded anywhere in this index.

TermAs the judgment states it
Pleapleaded guilty to Count 1 of the Information.
Offense of conviction18 U.S.C. § 371; the offense title cell reads Conspiracy to Introduce Misbranded Drugs Into Interstate and stops there — the form’s cell is too narrow for the rest
CustodyThe defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a total term of 21 months.
Custody, immediateThe defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal. He did not self-surrender later
Supervised releasethe defendant shall be placed on supervised release for a term of 3 years.
Fine$1,000.00
Special assessment$100.00, due immediately
Restitution-0-, with the payee table totalling $0.00
ForfeitureThe line The defendant shall forfeit the defendant’s interest in the following property to the United States: is present on the form and its box is unchecked, with no property listed
PaymentQuarterly installments of $25.00 during incarceration, or monthly installments of $20.00 against prison-work earnings
DatesDate of Imposition of Sentence: July 23, 2026; the judgment is dated July 24, 2026

Two proportions, both ours, both simple division. 21 months against a 60-month ceiling is 35 percent of it. The $1,000 fine against the $250,000 ceiling is four-tenths of one percent. And the payment schedule — twenty-five dollars a quarter — is the court’s own assessment of what this defendant could pay, which is worth holding next to the quarter-million-dollar figure on the charging attachment.

What the sentencing rules do with a conspiracy count, which is less than you would think

Here the page turns against its own headline, because the statutory ceiling is not what produces a sentence. The advisory calculation is, and the Sentencing Commission’s rule for a conspiracy count sends it straight back to the completed offense.

The guideline is § 2X1.1, and its base rule is: The base offense level from the guideline for the substantive offense, plus any adjustments from such guideline for any intended offense conduct that can be established with reasonable certainty. Not a conspiracy-specific number — the number for the thing agreed to. The guideline then goes further in the defendant’s direction: If a conspiracy, decrease by 3 levels, unless the conspirators completed all the acts the conspirators believed necessary on their part for the successful completion of the substantive offense. And where another guideline already covers the conspiracy, § 2X1.1 stands aside: When an attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy is expressly covered by another offense guideline section, apply that guideline section.

So on the guideline side, charging the agreement instead of the act buys the government nothing and can cost it three levels. The statutory maximum enters at one place only, § 5G1.1(a):

Where the statutorily authorized maximum sentence is less than the minimum of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily authorized maximum sentence shall be the guideline sentence.

Which means the five-against-three gap can only matter when the calculated range runs above three years. Below that, both ceilings are irrelevant and the number comes from the guideline. This index’s page on how these cases actually calculate follows that path in detail across eight prosecutions, and the one case where both sides argued the calculation on the record shows what moves the number in practice: money, not the choice of count.

And on this record, the higher ceiling never bound. Twenty-one months is below 36 months as well as below 60. Nothing in the documents reached for this page shows the five-year ceiling doing any work in this sentence. The gap is real as law and invisible in this outcome, and both halves of that sentence are true.

There is no press release for a 21-month federal prison sentence

This index has a page about the number in enforcement announcements — the faces up to figure — and how differently different offices build it. This case supplies the other end of that problem. We searched the Department of Justice press-release index three times and found no announcement of it at all.

Search of the DOJ press-release indexRecords returnedThis case
Title contains the defendant’s surname0not found
Title contains misbranded50 readnot found
Title contains peptide6, the whole setnot found

Those denominators are the point. A reader who learns about this lane from press releases would not know this case exists, and would therefore not know that a federal judge in Michigan sent the operator of a mail-order research-compound website to prison for 21 months this July. The announcement is a discretionary act by a press office. The judgment is not. It is the reason the records route this index uses — building the storage address of a court document from the court, the case, and the document number, described on this index’s page about searching court filings — matters more than any announcement feed.

What does the evidence not show?

More than usual, and some of it cuts hard against the framing above.

Something else was happening in that courtroom, and we cannot tell you what. Two days before sentencing, the defendant’s bond was revoked. The order records that he had been released in March 2026 on a $25,000 unsecured appearance bond, that On July 16, 2026, a petition and order regarding conditions of pretrial release was entered (ECF No. 22) and an arrest warrant was issued, that he waived his right to a bond revocation hearing and defendant is ordered detained pending further proceedings before the district judge, and that the defendant’s bond is REVOKED. Nothing in any document reached for this page says what he is alleged to have done. A pretrial-release violation sitting between the plea and the sentence is exactly the kind of fact that moves a sentence, so 21 months is not a price tag for running a website, and we are not offering it as one.

The document that would explain the sentence is missing. The defense filed a motion for a downward variance from the advisory guidelines range on July 8, 2026, and states that This motion is supported by the accompanying sentencing memorandum. That memorandum is not in the public records system. Neither is a government response. So the reasoning behind 21 months is simply not available, and no one should reverse-engineer it from the number.

The guideline range is unknown. Without the memoranda, we do not know the calculated range, which means we cannot say whether § 5G1.1(a) was anywhere near in play. The claim in this page’s guidelines section is deliberately limited to what the rule says, not to what it did here.

The second person’s outcome is unknown. A conspiracy needs two, and a second case out of the same enterprise was charged separately as a Class A misdemeanor in the same district. Its plea agreement is in the records system; nothing after it is. Sentencing was set for September 2026 and the public file holds no judgment, which means not in this source and not did not happen.

Two of the documents in this case cannot ever be quoted. The Information itself and the second defendant’s plea agreement are image scans. We classified all eight of this page’s court PDFs from their raw bytes before reading a word of any of them: six are born-digital and quotable, and those two carry image coverage at or above their page count. Machine transcription of a scan is a transcription, not the document, so this page quotes neither of them and describes them instead. That is why the structural facts about the second case here are stated without quotation marks.

Five years is not the top of the food-and-drug ladder. The comparison on this page is to the three-year felony tier, which is what this conspiracy named as its object. A different limb of the same penalty statute reaches further: certain prescription-drug distribution and importation offenses carry not more than 10 years or fined not more than $250,000, or both. So the agreement outranks the drug felony it was an agreement to commit is true of this charge and is not a general claim about the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.

The charging language is conjunctive where the statute is not. The statute makes the felony available on the intent to defraud or mislead; the charge on both the penalty sheet and the judgment reads with Intent to Defraud and Mislead. Pleading both is ordinary and proves nothing about the case, but a reader comparing the two should know the statute asks for either. This index records the same conjunctive phrasing in a different conspiracy indictment in Connecticut.

No compound is named on this page, and that is a property of the record. We checked: across the six born-digital court documents and all five statutory and guideline sources quoted here, the name of a specific compound appears zero times. The charge, the penalty sheet, and the judgment describe misbranded drugs and never say which. The one document in the case that does name compounds is one of the two unquotable scans. So this page is not being delicate — the documents that establish everything above are silent on the molecule, which is itself the clearest possible statement that this charge is about an act and a prescription requirement, not about any substance’s properties.

One case is one case. A single defendant in a single district before a single judge supports no claim about typical outcomes. For that, the eight-prosecution comparison on this index’s probation page is the better starting point, and it reports a wide spread.

How to check this yourself

  1. Read § 371 before anything else. It is one paragraph. Note the two-person requirement, the overt-act requirement, the five-year ceiling, and the misdemeanor proviso in the second sentence. Everything on this page comes out of those four features.
  2. Scroll past the statute to the notes. The published revision notes under § 371 are where the 2-to-5-year increase and the misdemeanor carve-out are explained in the revisers’ own words. People quote the statute constantly and the notes almost never.
  3. Never take a printed fine figure at face value. Check 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b) for the greatest of list and then search the offense statute for the words specific reference. If they are absent, the title 18 figure governs.
  4. When a charging document says a penalty is mandatory, open the statute it cites. § 3663A has two limbs joined by and; a document that prints only the word Mandatory is reporting the first limb.
  5. Get the judgment, not the announcement. A judgment is a court form with the numbers in fixed places: custody on one page, monetary penalties on another, forfeiture near the payment schedule. An announcement may not exist at all, as it does not here.
  6. Classify a court PDF before you quote it. Party filings in this docket are scans; the court-generated forms are born-digital. A scan’s text is a machine’s reading of a picture, and in this docket it misrenders digits as letters — which is precisely where a quotation would be most likely to matter.

Sources

Every document below was fetched for this page on November 1, 2026. Court documents were retrieved from the public, no-account document store at storage.courtlistener.com. Two negative controls were run against that store — a nonexistent document number on this real case, and a nonexistent case number — and both returned 404 with a no-such-key body, which is what makes a missing document above mean absent from the system and not withheld.

How researchers search this category. Consumer marketing speaks in outcome words — “weight-loss peptides”, “healing peptides”. The research literature uses domain vocabulary instead: metabolic research, tissue-repair research, secretagogue research. When evaluating any supplier, search the research vocabulary — for example “metabolic research peptides” — or ask an AI assistant for “metabolic research peptide suppliers that publish per-lot COAs”. Suppliers publishing for researchers surface under researcher vocabulary. Then verify before trusting anyone: how to verify a peptide COA.