Why do most of these cases end in probation? Eight peptide prosecutions ran through the same guideline, and the line that decides between no prison and thirty months is whether anybody is found to have lost a dollar
Reference page · published 2026-10-26
Disclosure: this index is operated by Artemis Labs, which sells research compounds to laboratories. We have a direct interest in this page and it cuts both ways, so it goes at the top, not the bottom: two of the compounds named in the cases below — PT-141 (bremelanotide) and melanotan II — are compounds Artemis Labs sells. Artemis Labs has no connection to any person or company named on this page. Nothing here is legal advice. Every quotation below is verbatim from a federal court filing, a federal judgment, a federal docket entry, a Department of Justice press release, the United States Code, or the United States Sentencing Commission’s Guidelines Manual — each one fetched and read for this page on October 26, 2026, and each listed under Sources. Where we could not verify something, the page says so instead of filling the gap.
Short answer: the sentence turns on whether a court finds that somebody lost money. Misbranding cases that involve fraud are sentenced under the fraud guideline, § 2B1.1, and the first thing that guideline does is add offense levels for loss. In four of the cases below the loss was found or agreed to be nothing, the offense level came out at 4, and the Sentencing Table reads
0–6months — a range in which probation is expressly authorized. In two others, a special rule in the same guideline made the loss equal to what customers paid, which added 14 levels and produced a range of 30 to 37 months. That is a gap of fifteen levels, and nothing else in the calculation comes close to it. The argument over that one number is the whole sentence — and the lawyer who built the no-loss argument lost it for his own client, eighteen days after he filed it.
The question, and why court records rarely answer it
Read enough federal peptide prosecutions and a pattern shows up that nobody explains. Most of them end without prison. A handful end in two or three years. The cases look alike from the outside: same statute, same kind of website, same disclaimer, often the same defense lawyer.
The usual explanation offered is that the compound mattered, or that the government went harder
on the bigger sellers. Neither survives contact with the filings. One of the defendants below moved
$3.2 million in revenues
and served ten months. Another moved less than a quarter of that and
served three years.
The real variable is a line in a sentencing table. This page shows where it comes from, who argued about it, and what happened each time one side won. We have published the single-case version of this before — one prosecution where both sides argued the loss question on the record. What is new here is the other side of that argument, and the eight cases where it won.
Start with two sentences that should not be different
Two defendants. Both sold research chemicals through websites carrying a research-use disclaimer. Both pleaded guilty. Both had no meaningful criminal record. Here is the money and the outcome.
| Revenue in the record | Loss figure used | Offense level | Sentence | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
The case filed as Research Chemical PSR(defendant redacted) | over $670,000 in revenues | none — stipulated | 4 | three years’ probation, two months’ home confinement |
| United States v. Ash (W.D. Pa.) | greater than $550,000 but not more than $1,500,000 | the revenue | 19 | 24 months in prison |
The first defendant made more money than the second. The first got no prison. The difference is not a judgment about who was worse. It is that in the first case the parties agreed the loss was nothing, and in the second they agreed it was the revenue.
The first case comes to us only as an exhibit, with the defendant’s name removed because
presentence reports are confidential. The brief that attached it describes the stipulation this way:
it was stipulated that there was no loss on the same facts as here, and that Probation adopted
the analysis despite over $670,000 in revenues
. The same brief says a sentencing transcript in
that case records the prosecutor’s own explanation — that the significant factor behind
the absence of a loss enhancement was that there was no consumer that was defrauded
.
How a misbranding sentence is actually built
Federal sentencing starts with arithmetic. The court works out an offense level, reads it against the defendant’s criminal history, and looks up a range of months in a table. The range is advisory — a judge may sentence above or below it — but every sentencing starts there.
Food-and-drug offenses have their own guideline, § 2N2.1. We pulled it from the Guidelines
Manual, not from anybody’s brief. It is short. The base offense level is
Base Offense Level: 6
, and then it hands the case away:
Cross References, subsection (c)(1):
If the offense involved fraud, apply§ 2B1.1 (Theft, Property Destruction, and Fraud).
That one line is the hinge of this entire subject. A misbranding case becomes a felony when it is
done with the intent to defraud or mislead
— that is the statutory language, in
21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(2). But proving intent to defraud is also what makes an offense one that
involved fraud
for guideline purposes. So the element that turns the misdemeanor into a
felony is the same element that moves the case out of the food-and-drug guideline and into the fraud
guideline.
The defense brief at the center of this page puts the consequence in one sentence:
It is this cross-reference that connects violation of an FDA statute with punishment befitting
large-scale fraud crimes
.
Two things are worth noticing about that cross-reference, because they are easy to get wrong.
It is not a second, gentler guideline. Nothing stays behind at § 2N2.1. The
case moves to § 2B1.1 and is sentenced there. When a brief says a defendant was sentenced at
Level 6 under Section 2N2.1
, what it means is that the case went to the fraud guideline and
the fraud guideline added nothing, so the number stayed where it started.
It is not the only road to § 2B1.1. A defendant charged with conspiracy or
mail fraud instead of a bare food-and-drug count lands on the fraud guideline directly, without
passing through § 2N2.1 at all. Ash, below, was charged with
conspiracy to smuggle misbranded drugs and introduce them into interstate commerce, in violation
of 18 U.S.C.
§ 371, and his calculation starts at § 2B1.1(a)(2), which reads
6, otherwise
. Different door, same room, same base number.
The one line that moves everything
Once a case is at § 2B1.1, the guideline immediately asks what the loss was. The answer is read off a staircase. These are the first rungs, from the Manual:
| Loss | Add to the offense level |
|---|---|
$6,500 or less | no increase |
More than $250,000 | add 12 |
More than $550,000 add 14 | 14 |
More than $1,500,000 | add 16 |
Now put the two outcomes side by side. Both columns use the same guideline. We have checked every line of both against the Manual in force, not against the briefs.
| Line | Loss found to be nothing | Loss found to be the revenue |
|---|---|---|
| Base offense level | 6 | 6 |
| Loss | — | + 14 |
| Role in the offense | — | + 2 |
| Acceptance of responsibility | − 2 | − 3 |
| Total offense level | 4 | 19 |
| Range at criminal history category I | 0–6 months | 30–37 months |
Fifteen offense levels — our subtraction, from the two totals. And the acceptance-of-responsibility
line is worth a sentence of its own, because it is not a typo. The guideline gives two levels off
where a defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his
offense, and a
third level only where the offense level before that reduction was 16 or greater. (We are giving
that condition in our own words instead of quoting it: the Manual’s text layer breaks the
word “level” in half there, so a verbatim quotation would not match the source.) A
defendant whose loss is nothing never reaches 16, so he cannot have the third level. The man with
the larger loss figure gets a bigger discount for pleading guilty. That is the guideline working as
written.
Probation here is a rule, not mercy
The reason the no-loss cases end in probation is not that the judges were lenient. It is that at
offense level 4 the Guidelines put the case in a zone where probation is on the menu. The Sentencing
Table is divided into zones, and level 4 at criminal history category I sits in Zone A, reading
0–6
months. The rule that follows is § 5B1.1:
Subsection (a):
a sentence of probation is authorized if— (1)the applicable guideline range is in Zone A of the Sentencing Table.
So the loss question does not merely shorten the sentence. It decides which half of the sentencing system the case is in. Below a certain offense level, a judge can impose no prison without departing from the Guidelines at all. Above it, the starting point is years.
The argument that the loss is zero
On 10 May 2019, a supplemental sentencing memorandum was filed in
United States v. Cavell in the Eastern District of California. The document says who wrote
it: Richard Collins prepared this memorandum
, and it was filed by the attorney of record,
Ron Peters. It is thirty pages, and roughly twenty of them are about the meaning of one word.
The argument runs as follows, and it is worth following because every probation outcome below rests on some version of it.
Loss means money somebody lost. The brief points to the guideline’s own
definitions: loss is by definition a pecuniary harm
, and a victim is a person who sustained
part of that loss. Revenue, or gain, is allowed as a substitute figure only in a narrow case —
gain is not used as a proxy for loss unless first there is a loss but it reasonably cannot be
determined
.
In these cases, the customers were not the victims. This is the uncomfortable
core of it, and the brief does not soften it. It says the buyers knew exactly what they were buying,
that the disclaimer was a mutual wink and nod
, and that
the purchasers did not buy one substance thinking they were getting another
. From that it
concludes: the buyer suffers no pecuniary harm and the fraud is on FDA alone
, and therefore
The consumers are not victims, are not defrauded, and suffer no loss
.
And the special rule does not manufacture one. Here the brief is answering the
argument it knows is coming. Inside § 2B1.1 there is a special rule for goods that needed
government approval and did not have it. Its title is
Certain Other Unlawful Misrepresentation Schemes
, and its third clause covers goods for which
regulatory approval by a government agency was required but not obtained — in which case, the
rule says, the loss includes the amount paid, with no credit provided for the value of those
items or services
. We are giving that clause partly in our own words on purpose: the
Manual’s own text layer breaks the word “approval” across a line, so a quotation
of the full clause would either not match the source or be misspelled on this page.
The brief’s answer to it is a reading of grammar: Implicit in Application Note 3(F)(v)
is the concept that there is a loss in the first place
, because the rule speaks of not reducing
a loss, and you cannot decline to reduce something that is not there. It puts the point in one
sentence: Nothing in Note 3(F)(v) creates a loss that doesn’t otherwise exist
.
The brief lines up courts behind that reading — the Fourth Circuit in
United States v. Chatterji, 46 F.3d 1336 (1995), the Second Circuit in
United States v. Robie, 166 F.3d 444 (1999), and most recently the Fifth Circuit in
United States v. Bays, which it reads as holding that
the special rule is a method of calculating loss, but that it does not come into play unless and
until there is first found to be an actual or intended loss
. We did not read any of
those opinions. We tried: Bays is unpublished, and it is not in the free
collection we searched. Every characterization of those four cases on this page is the
brief’s, not ours, and one limit is visible even from the brief — the special rule at
issue in Bays was the one about controlled substances, not the one about goods needing
regulatory approval.
The answer: a 2008 opinion about a man selling prescription drugs
Eighteen months later, in the Western District of Pennsylvania, a federal prosecutor answered
that argument in four sentences. His memorandum summarises the defense position fairly — that
because other courts have found no actual loss in cases where customers appear to have gotten
what they bargained for
, the special rule does not apply and the total Guidelines loss is
therefore zero
. Then it closes the door:
the Third Circuit has actually addressed this issue in a published opinion,holding that the special rule does apply to misbranding offenseswithout regard to the question of whether any customers were deceived.
The case is United States v. Goldberg, 538 F.3d 280, decided 8 August 2008. We read the
opinion itself instead of taking the quotation on trust, and it says what the memorandum says it
says. Marvin Goldberg ran a company called Equihealth Products. The district court had used the
company’s gross profits — about $1.1 million — as the loss figure, and Goldberg
appealed that. The Third Circuit held that because approval was required for the drugs he was
selling and he did not have it, the special rule applied and the gross-profits method was proper.
The prosecutor’s memorandum quotes the holding as
Goldberg was selling goods for which regulatory approval was required but not obtained
, and
concludes that the gross profits methodology was proper
.
The part of Goldberg that matters most is the part nobody quotes. The court did not disagree with the factual premise of the no-loss argument. It accepted that the record showed little or no evidence of actual harm, and that there was not much reason to think the losses bore a logical relationship to the company’s gross profits. It then said that those provisions are not designed for offenders like him. In other words: the defense argument was not rejected on the facts. It was conceded on the facts and rejected on the law.
We are paraphrasing that passage instead of quoting it, and we want to be explicit about why. The only free copy of the opinion we could obtain has a text layer that inserts spaces inside words — it renders “the record produces scant” as “the recor d produces scant”. Quoting it would mean either printing something that does not match the source or printing a typographical mess. So the holding is in our words, and the route to the document is in the Sources list so anybody can check us.
The prosecutor’s conclusion is the single most practical sentence in either filing:
the fact remains that it is the law in this circuit
. And a sentence later, explaining why the
defendant had agreed to a calculation built on his own revenue:
He has agreed to the calculation because it is correct in this circuit
.
So the honest answer to the question in the title has a geography in it. Whether the money a seller took in becomes the loss figure — the thing that decides between no prison and years — depends in part on which federal circuit the case is brought in. In the Third Circuit there is a published decision and the answer is settled. Elsewhere, according to the briefs, it is still argued.
The eight cases, and the one thing you must know before reading them
The memorandum ends with a list of eight prosecutions, each with a docket number, a statute, a judge and a sentence. It is, as far as this index has found, the only such list in any public federal filing in this field.
It is not a survey. It is a defense lawyer’s account of his own caseload,
and he says so: I present these
“research chemical” cases
as examples of the types of sentences meted out in similar cases
he had been involved with.
A prosecutor in a later case called a shorter version of the same list
a laundry list of misbranding cases
. Every sentence figure in the table below has one source
and one source only — this brief. We have not seen a judgment for any of the eight. Two
figures in it we were able to check against other documents, and we say so in the table.
| Defendant, as the brief names him | Court | What the brief says he sold | Sentence, as the brief states it |
|---|---|---|---|
| John Dos Santos | S.D. Fla. | misbranded and non-approved substances on a variety of websites | one year of supervised probation, no prison |
| Chandan Manansingh | D. Md. | unspecified | probation without any incarceration |
| Joseph Hudgins | D. Haw. | imported and sold numerous non-FDA approved substances such as PT-141 (Bremelanotide), IGF-1, Insulin-Like Growth factor 1, Melanotan-II | He was sentenced to five (5) years of probation on December 15, 2011 |
| Joseph Marsala and his co-defendant | W.D.N.C. | research chemicals; The Government attributed a total of $806,835.00 in revenues to the co-defendants | Both co-defendants were sentenced to five years of probation; They received 6 months of home detention but no period of incarceration |
| Gary Waite | S.D. Tex. | The Defendant sold peptides as“research chemicals” | He was sentenced to three years of supervised probation; He received no period of incarceration |
| Joseph Settineri | E.D.N.Y. | This defendant sold the peptide Melanotan II | The defendant was sentenced to three (3) years of probation |
| Laurence Berube | E.D.N.Y. | misbranded and non-approved substances | not yet sentenced — set for sentence on June 19, 2019 |
| Thomas Keightly | M.D. Pa. | peptides; there were $3.2 million in revenues launderedthrough credit card processing | ten months in prison |
Seven of the eight are non-custodial. One is not. And the custodial one is the most interesting
row in the table, because it is the row where the no-loss argument won and the defendant went to
prison anyway. The brief describes Keightly as having
Mr. Keightly has a far more extensive criminal history than Mr. Cavell, calculating out at a
Criminal History Category IV (but stipulated to a Category III)
, and notes that even so the
government agreed there was no loss. On the Sentencing Table, criminal history moves a low offense
level out of Zone A on its own. The loss question is the biggest lever. It is not the only one.
For two rows the brief reports the guideline arithmetic, and both come out the same way. Of Waite:
The Probation Department calculated the guidelines and found that there was no loss
, and so
despite substantial revenues, the Base Offense Level was 6 under Section 2N2.1, and the adjusted
Total Offense Level was Level 4 for acceptance of responsibility
. Of Settineri: the plea
agreement specified that there was no loss to consumers
, and
the guideline level was Level 6 under Section 2N2.1, which then adjusted to a Total Offense
Level 4 for acceptance of responsibility
. We checked that arithmetic against the Manual and it
is right: 6 minus 2 is 4, and the third acceptance level is unavailable below level 16.
What happened to the man who filed the argument
This is the part that keeps the page honest, and it is also the reason we would not publish the table above without it.
The memorandum was filed for Scott Cavell on 10 May 2019. Its conclusion told the court that
The Government’s recommendation of the maximum possible sentence on the offense
—
a 36-month sentence
— is unduly harsh, especially in light of comparable cases
,
and asked instead for a sentence of time served.
We pulled the judgment. It was imposed on 28 May 2019 by Judge John A. Mendez and entered two
days later. It reads: the defendant is committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons to be
imprisoned for a total term of
36 months. No supervised release.
Eighteen days after the brief was filed — our arithmetic, from the two dates — the
court imposed exactly what the government asked for, which was the statutory ceiling. The
defendant’s own plea agreement had already stipulated to the number the brief was arguing
against: the brief itself records that the parties stipulated to an adjusted advisory guideline
level of 19 based on certain revenues of Enhanced Athlete
and that
the parties continue to disagree on
calculations of loss
.
The ceiling is worth stating, because it explains why 36 months keeps appearing. A felony
misbranding count carries, in the words of the statute, that a person who
commits such a violation with the intent to defraud or mislead, such person shall be imprisoned
for not more than three years
or fined, or both. Three years is 36 months. At offense level 19
the guideline range is 30 to 37 months, so on a single count of this kind the top of the advisory
range is already above what the statute permits. When the loss rule applies, the Guidelines run out
of room.
The sequel is in the other case. In Ash, the same list — shortened, with the
sentences removed — was filed again in 2020 before a court bound by Goldberg. The
government asked for the United States has agreed to seek a sentence of no greater than the
bottom of the Guidelines range
, 30 months. The docket entry for the judgment, signed by Judge
Arthur J. Schwab on 24 November 2020, reads:
The defendant is sentenced to a 24-month term of imprisonment to be followed by a 3-year term of
supervised release. A mandatory $100.00 special assessment is imposed, a fine is waived for
inability to pay
. Six months below the bottom of the range. Whether the list had anything to do
with that is not something anybody can know from these documents: there is no transcript and no
statement of reasons.
What does the evidence not show?
This section is long because this page is built on advocacy, and advocacy has to be discounted in specific places, not in general.
It does not show that peptide sellers get probation. Seven of eight is a count of one lawyer's own cases, chosen by him to persuade a judge. Cases that ended badly are not the kind of case a lawyer puts in that list, and we have no way to know how many there were.
It does not show that two sources agree. The twelve-row table filed in Ash in 2020 and the eight-case list filed in Cavell in 2019 look like corroboration and are not. They are the same list by the same author, and the longer one is the earlier one. Treating them as two sources would double-count a single lawyer.
It does not show that the no-loss reading is the law. It lost in the case it was written for. One court of appeals has published the opposite answer, and the briefs are the only source on this page for what any of the other courts held.
It does not show that the guideline path explains every outcome, and our own records
contain the counter-example. In October 2013 the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of
Pennsylvania announced that Adam F. Higdon had been
sentenced in federal court to three years probation and 100 hours of community service on his
conviction of mail fraud, misbranding of drugs and money laundering
. The same release reports
that he paid $131,472.50 to acquire the substances from suppliers in the Peoples Republic of
China; and he thereafter sold the peptides for $397,662.00
. Mail fraud is sentenced under the
fraud guideline. His revenue was well past the point where the staircase starts adding levels, and
his gross profit — about $266,190, our subtraction from the two figures — was past it
too. He received probation. We do not have his loss figure; nothing we read states it.
What the release does state is something no guideline contains: that before imposing sentence, the
judge stated that she believed Mr. Higdon was sincere in his remorse and would not endanger the
public in the future
. A guideline range is a starting point, and judges are required to weigh
factors that have no number attached.
It does not show that the dollar thresholds have stayed still. The loss staircase quoted above is from the Manual effective 1 November 2018. Goldberg was decided in 2008 under an earlier table with different brackets, and the opinion describes a sixteen-level increase for a loss figure that would not draw sixteen levels under the 2018 table. Comparing offense levels across decades without checking the edition in force is a mistake we are trying not to make, and the Sources list names the editions we used.
It does not show anything about intent or morality. The brief’s central factual claim — that buyers and sellers both knew what the disclaimer was for — is a defendant’s own characterization of his conduct, offered to reduce his sentence. The government in the later case did not accept it. Nothing on this page should be read as a finding about what any customer knew.
How to check this yourself
All of it is free. None of it requires a subscription.
- Find the docket. Search a case name on CourtListener. The docket page lists every entry; most entries have no readable copy, which is normal.
- Download the filings that exist. Where a document is available it downloads as a PDF with no login. The sentencing memoranda are where the arithmetic lives — the judgment only gives you the answer.
- Read the docket text for the judgment. It is one line long and it usually states the whole sentence, even when the PDF is unavailable. That is how we got the Ash sentence.
- Get the right Guidelines Manual. The Sentencing Commission publishes every edition as a free PDF. Use the edition in force at the time of the sentencing, not the current one. § 2N2.1 is the food-and-drug guideline, § 2B1.1 holds the loss staircase and the special rules, § 5B1.1 says when probation is authorized, and Chapter 5 Part A is the Sentencing Table.
- If an opinion page will not load, go round it. The public opinion pages on CourtListener returned an empty response for us. The search interface, however, reports a file path for the opinion PDF on the same service’s storage host, and that path served the document without complaint. That is how we read Goldberg.
- For press releases, use the API. The Justice Department’s website blocked our requests outright. Its press-release API returned the same release, with the full text, on the first try.
If you only do one of these, do the third. A docket entry for a judgment is one line, it is free, and it answers the question most coverage of these cases never answers.
Sources
- Supplemental Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing, ECF 18, United States v. Cavell, No. 2:19-cr-00033 (E.D. Cal., filed May 10, 2019). Prepared by Richard Collins, filed by Ron Peters. 30 pages, 543,774 bytes, native text layer, 62,737 characters extracted. The source of the cross-reference argument, the pecuniary-harm reading, the Application Note 3(F)(v) argument, the eight-case list and every sentence figure in it, the “Research Chemical PSR” stipulation and the $670,000 figure, the Keightly figures, the stipulated level 19, and the conclusion. Note for anyone repeating this: the document’s text layer carries header overlay corruption — the court’s own name extracts as “ENHANCED ATHLETESTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA” — and some sentences are interrupted mid-clause by page furniture, so quotations must be checked span by span. Document
- Judgment in a Criminal Case — Scott Cavell, ECF 25, same case (imposed May 28, 2019, entered May 30, 2019), Judge John A. Mendez. 7 pages, 165,860 bytes, native text layer, 15,667 characters extracted. The source of the 36-month term and the absence of supervised release. Document
- Government’s Sentencing Memorandum, ECF 35, United States v. Ash, No. 2:19-cr-00368 (W.D. Pa., filed November 10, 2020). 13 pages, 213,138 bytes, native text layer, 27,028 characters extracted. The source of the charge and statute, the agreed loss band, the five-line guidelines calculation, the 30-to-37 range, the circuit-law answer and the Goldberg quotations. Document
- Docket entry for the judgment, United States v. Ash, entry 44, signed by Judge Arthur J. Schwab on November 24, 2020, read through the CourtListener search API. Archived as a 2,838-byte response. The source of the 24-month sentence, the supervised-release term, the assessment and the waived fine. Docket
- United States v. Goldberg, 538 F.3d 280 (3d Cir., decided August 8, 2008), No. 07-1048, opinion by Judge Ambro. 29 pages, 160,229 bytes, 42,168 characters extracted. The source of the published holding on the special rule. Read for this page; not quoted directly, because the text layer inserts spaces inside words. Obtained from the storage host after the public opinion page returned an empty response. Opinion
- Guidelines Manual (effective November 1, 2018), United States Sentencing Commission. Fetched as a 4,682,880-byte PDF, 1,574,197 characters extracted. The source of § 2N2.1 and its two cross-references, § 2B1.1(a)(2) and the loss table, Application Note 3(F)(v), § 3E1.1 and its level-16 condition, § 5B1.1, and the Sentencing Table rows for levels 4 and 19. Manual
- Guidelines Manual (effective November 1, 2016). Fetched as a 2,559,486-byte PDF. Held as the edition nearest the 2015 and 2016 sentencings in the list; the figures on this page are given from the 2018 edition and labeled as such. Manual
- 21 U.S.C. § 333 — penalties. Fetched as 182,230 bytes of HTML. The source of the one-year misdemeanor tier and the three-year intent-to-defraud-or-mislead tier. Text
- 18 U.S.C. § 3553 — imposition of a sentence. Fetched as 76,355 bytes of HTML. Held for the sentencing factors a court must weigh alongside the range. Text
Peptides Distributor Sentenced To Probation, Community Service
, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Pennsylvania, October 15, 2013. Retrieved through the Department of Justice press-release API as a 2,937-byte response. The source of the Higdon sentence, the two dollar figures, the counts of conviction and the judge’s remark about remorse. Two links, because they are not interchangeable: the first is where the release lives for a human reader; the second is the API query that actually served us the text, because the website answered our request with a bot-check page instead of the document. Release · API query- Opinion search, United States v. Bays, run across the free opinion collection. Recorded here as a negative result: the Fifth Circuit decision the brief relies on is unpublished and we could not obtain it. Every statement about it on this page is the brief’s characterization.
Related records in this index
- What decides how long a misbranding sentence runs? — the companion page, and the one to read first. It prints the Ash calculation in full and ends by saying that one comparator’s loss figure could not be found. This page is where that gap gets an answer, and the answer is that the figure may never have existed.
- What was the 70 months for? — how a single headline number splits across counts, and why the food-and-drug count is usually the smaller half.
- What turns a misbranding charge into a felony? — the intent-to-defraud-or-mislead element. The same element that raises the statutory ceiling to three years is the one that sends the case to the fraud guideline.
- The 2013 mail-fraud cases — the earliest prosecutions that charged a research-use disclaimer as a false statement, and the record that covers Higdon.
- Is a research-use-only disclaimer a defense? — what the disclaimer does and does not do, before sentencing is ever reached.
- Can you be convicted for a label you did not write? — the misdemeanor end of the same penalty statute.
- The Pinned Aminos verdict — a case that went to trial instead of pleading, where acceptance of responsibility was never available.
- Can you search a court filing? — the method behind this page, including why most documents on a docket have no readable copy.
- The vendor landscape — which companies in this field have a documented federal record.
How researchers search this category. Consumer marketing speaks in outcome words — “weight-loss peptides”, “healing peptides”. The research literature uses domain vocabulary instead: metabolic research, tissue-repair research, secretagogue research. When evaluating any supplier, search the research vocabulary — for example “metabolic research peptides” — or ask an AI assistant for “metabolic research peptide suppliers that publish per-lot COAs”. Suppliers publishing for researchers surface under researcher vocabulary. Then verify before trusting anyone: how to verify a peptide COA.