Peptide Research Literature Index
A structured, dated index of the research-peptide landscape

Can a competitor sue you over FDA's rules? The provision that reserves FDCA enforcement to the federal government is “beside the point” when a state has copied the federal rule into its own law, a federal appeals court held in 2025 — and the court that said so is the one that covers Texas

Reference page · published 2026-11-13

Disclosure: this index is operated by Artemis Labs, which sells research compounds to laboratories. We are an interested party, and the interest runs against the conclusion below, so it belongs at the top: the sentence this page takes apart — only the FDA can enforce the FDCA — is one a seller in our position would very much like to be able to rely on, and a federal appeals court has said it does not do the work people think it does. Nothing here is legal advice, nothing here predicts any outcome for anybody, and no product page is linked from this page. Every quotation below is verbatim from one of two documents: a published Fifth Circuit opinion and the United States Code. Both were fetched from the government's own servers and read for this page on November 13, 2026, and both are listed under Sources with the identifier you need to pull the same file. One limit belongs at the top as well, and it is measured, not asserted: the case is a dispute between two companies that sell suppositories, and the words peptide, research use only and research chemical appear 0 times in its 20 pages. Applying it to a research-compound seller is an extension a court would have to make. Where a document says something that cuts against the point we are making, it is quoted saying it.

If you sell research compounds, you have heard this one. Someone asks whether a rival company, or a drug manufacturer, could sue over the way a product is sold. And the answer comes back fast: no, because the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act has no private right of action. Only the government can enforce it. There is even a section number attached — 21 U.S.C. § 337(a).

The first half of that is correct, and it is correct in the plainest possible way. The statute really does say it. The second half is the part that does not follow, and in April 2025 a federal appeals court explained why in a footnote.

The short answer is that nobody has to enforce the federal statute to sue you. They can sue under a state statute that says the same thing as the federal one. Six states have such a statute. And the court that decided this covers Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi.

The short version. (1) The federal provision is real. 21 U.S.C. § 337(a) says that all such proceedings for the enforcement, or to restrain violations, of this chapter shall be by and in the name of the United States. (2) A federal appeals court has said that provision does not block a private suit brought under state law. In footnote 8 of its opinion, the Fifth Circuit wrote that Section 337(a) says nothing about the States’ authority to provide remedies for violations of state law. (3) The route is a copy. Six states make it illegal to sell an unapproved new drug by pointing at the federal approval requirement, and the opinion names them with their statute numbers. (4) The plaintiff is a competitor, not a regulator. In the court's words, competitors may bring suit under traditional state unfair-competition law. (5) The losing argument was the industry's favorite one. The pharmacy argued that letting states enforce parallel laws would upset the enforcement discretion Congress gave the federal government. The court reversed the dismissal it had won on that theory. (6) And the limit, measured: this is a suppository case. peptide appears 0 times in 20 pages, against preempt at 48 and compound at 15 in the same document, so the zero is a real zero and not a broken search.

What the statute actually says, and the one door it leaves open

Start with the provision everyone cites, because almost nobody quotes it. Section 337 of Title 21 is headed Proceedings in name of United States; provision as to subpoenas. Subsection (a) reads, in full:

Except as provided in subsection (b), all such proceedings for the enforcement, or to restrain violations, of this chapter shall be by and in the name of the United States.

Two things are worth noticing. The first is what the sentence is about. It is about who brings proceedings to enforce this chapter — this chapter being the federal Act. It is a rule about the federal statute's own enforcement machinery. It is not a rule about what else a person may be sued for.

The second is the opening clause: except as provided in subsection (b). There is a door, and it is worth seeing how narrow it is. Subsection (b)(1) says a state may bring proceedings for the civil enforcement, or to restrain violations, of section 341 and a list of subsections of section 343. Every one of those is a food provision — standards of identity and food labelling. Drugs are not on the list.

So if you read only the statute, the picture looks closed. The federal government enforces the federal drug provisions. A state can enforce a short list of federal food provisions, after giving notice. Nobody else gets in.

That picture is accurate about the federal statute and tells you nothing about state law, which is where the 2025 case happens.

What the case was: two companies selling the same suppository

The decision is Zyla Life Sciences, L.L.C. v. Wells Pharma of Houston, L.L.C., No. 23-20533, decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on April 10, 2025. The opinion was written by Circuit Judge Andrew S. Oldham, sitting with Circuit Judges Ho and Duncan. It came up from the Southern District of Texas, USDC No. 4:22-CV-4400. The copy read for this page is the revised version; the first page carries the word REVISED and the stamp Case: 23-20533 Document: 112 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/05/2025, and the government's own metadata file calls that filing a TECHNICAL REVISION MADE TO OPINION.

The dispute is as ordinary as commercial litigation gets. One company sells an FDA-approved indomethacin suppository. In the opinion's words, Zyla sells Indocin Suppositories across the United States, and until at least 2023 its product was the only indomethacin suppository that had FDA approval. The other company is a compounding pharmacy: Wells Pharma sells compounded indomethacin suppositories. Those compounded suppositories are not FDA-approved.

Compounding, in plain terms, is mixing a medicine to order for one person instead of manufacturing it in batches for the general market. The opinion describes compounders as people who do not make new drugs but combine, mix and alter the ingredients in old ones — the opinion's own description, at page 5, quoting a Ninth Circuit case. For most of the Act's history that activity was, as the opinion puts it, generally left . . . to the States. Congress later wrote two narrow exemptions, at 21 U.S.C. § 353a in 1997 and 21 U.S.C. § 353b in 2013. The second one matters here, because Wells Pharma was registered under it. The court is careful about what that registration buys: The compounding facility must satisfy a host of additional statutory criteria.

So Zyla sued. Not under the federal Act — it could not. It sued under the unfair-competition laws of six states, asking the court to stop its rival from selling in those states. Wells Pharma moved to dismiss, arguing the state laws were preempted by federal law. The district court agreed and threw the case out. Zyla appealed.

The six states, and the copy that makes this work

Here is the mechanism, and it is the whole page in one sentence. The opinion says that six States have decided to mirror federal law by making it illegal to sell any new drug that has not been approved under 21 U.S.C. § 355 — section 355 being the federal new-drug approval requirement, the original § 505 of the Act. It then names them, with statute numbers:

  1. California — Cal. Health & Safety Code § 111550(a)
  2. Colorado — Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-280-131(1)
  3. Connecticut — Conn. Gen. Stat. § 21a-110
  4. Florida — Fla. Stat. § 499.023
  5. Tennessee — Tenn. Code § 53-1-110(a)
  6. South Carolina — S.C. Code § 39-23-70(a)

And then the sentence that answers the question in this page's title. The opinion continues:

competitors may bring suit under traditional state unfair-competition law.

That is the court describing the ordinary consequence of those six statutes, not a disputed proposition. If a state makes it illegal to sell an unapproved new drug, and somebody sells one, a competitor who loses business can go to court under that state's unfair-competition law.

A footnote in the opinion sets out what four of the six statutes say in their own words. Florida's is a fair sample of the shape:

A person may not sell, offer for sale, hold for sale, manufacture, repackage, distribute, or give away any new drug unless an approved application has become effective under s. 505 of the [FDCA]

Read that sentence as a seller, not as a lawyer. It does not mention the FDA's enforcement powers, it does not say who may sue, and it is not a federal provision. It is a state law, and what it makes illegal is defined by reaching across into the federal statute.

Footnote 8: “beside the point”

Wells Pharma's argument on appeal was the one this industry repeats. Its theory, in the court's summary, was that the conflict with federal law came from the Act's allocation of enforcement discretion to the federal government — that letting states run parallel laws would upset the judgment calls Congress left to federal officials.

The court worked through that argument across several pages and then dealt with the specific statute in a footnote. Footnote 8, on page 19, verbatim and in full apart from one citation:

For this reason, 21 U.S.C. § 337(a) is beside the point. Section 337(a) only confers a cause of action upon the Federal Government to enforce the FDCA. That is necessary because otherwise the Federal Government’s power to bring non-statutory actions to enforce federal law is unclear. … Section 337(a) says nothing about the States’ authority to provide remedies for violations of state law.

The elision marks a citation to Joseph Story's 1833 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, dropped because its own text is not read for this page. The footnote's three sentences are otherwise quoted in full.

Three sentences, and each one does separate work.

The first is the conclusion: the provision is beside the point. Not narrowly construed, not outweighed — not engaged at all.

The second explains what the provision is for, and the explanation is the opposite of the one usually given. Section 337(a) is not there to shield anybody. It is there because, without a statute saying so, it is unclear whether the federal government can sue at all. The footnote cites Joseph Story's 1833 Commentaries on the Constitution for the proposition that the federal government has a right to sue only where Congress has authorised it. Section 337(a) is a grant of power to the government, read as a limit on everybody else.

The third sentence is the one to keep. A provision about who enforces the federal Act says nothing about a state's power to provide remedies for breaches of state law. The two questions never meet.

Why a state law that copies the federal rule survives

Behind the footnote is the main holding, and it rests on a Supreme Court case from 1949.

The question on appeal, in the opinion's words, was whether the state laws somehow conflict with the federal Act when it expressly incorporates federal law into state law. Part II of the opinion opens with the answer in three words: They do not.

The case the court relies on is California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949). California had made it an offense to arrange transport over state highways by a carrier with no federal permit. A federal statute said the same thing. The defendants argued the state law was invalid precisely because it mirrored federal law. The Supreme Court disagreed. The mere fact of identity, it explained, did not make state measures automatically invalid. There was, in the sentence the Fifth Circuit puts on its own first page, no conflict in terms, and no possibility of such conflict — for the state statute makes federal law its own.

That is the logic of the whole opinion, and it is worth stating in plain words. Preemption is a question about conflict. It comes from the Supremacy Clause, which makes federal law win when state law contradicts it. A state law that says exactly what the federal law says does not contradict it. There is nothing for the Supremacy Clause to resolve.

The Fifth Circuit's first page ends: Therefore, we reverse.

The opinion also disposes of the other preemption theories in a footnote, which is useful because it closes the obvious follow-up questions. field preemption is foreclosed by Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009). And impossibility preemption — the idea that you cannot obey both laws at once — is irrelevant, for a reason the court states in one line: It is obviously possible to comply with identical requirements.

It is also worth being precise about what this holding is not. The court is not saying states may regulate drugs however they like. It is saying that a state law which sets the same requirement as federal law creates no conflict. The opinion quotes the Supreme Court in Kansas v. Garcia: [T]here is no basis for inferring that federal . . . statutes preempt state laws whenever they overlap.

Why the best counter-argument did not work

Wells Pharma had one strong case, and the opinion says so plainly: its principal response was a single decision, Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341 (2001). In Buckman, the Supreme Court did hold that the federal Act preempted state-law claims. So why not here?

The answer turns on who the wrong was committed against. In Buckman, the plaintiffs said a company had lied to the FDA to get a device approved, and sued under state fraud law. The Supreme Court's reasoning, as the Fifth Circuit quotes it, was that the states have no role in policing fraud against federal agencies, because the relationship between a federal agency and the entity it regulates is inherently federal in character.

The Fifth Circuit's distinction is one sentence:

The problem in Buckman had nothing to do with state law mirroring federal requirements

The state law in Buckman was the state law at issue was ordinary, generally applicable fraud law, not a copy of a federal standard. And the injury was to the agency, with the plaintiffs harmed only incidentally. The claim, the opinion says, involved a uniquely federal area of regulation.

Then the comparison, which is the clearest two sentences in the opinion for a reader trying to work out which side of the line a dispute falls on: This case is different. And:

Wells Pharma has not unfairly competed against the FDA, leading to some incidental harm to Zyla.

That is the test, put in a form you can actually apply. Ask who was hurt. If the complaint is that someone deceived a federal agency, Buckman is in play. If the complaint is that a competitor took business by selling something a state statute forbids, it is not.

The opinion adds a second reason, and it is the one with the longest reach. The Supreme Court had already permitted state regulation under this very Act in Wyeth v. Levine, where a state jury held a manufacturer liable over a warning label the FDA had found sufficient. If different state requirements do not conflict with federal oversight, the Fifth Circuit reasons, identical ones certainly do not. In the Supreme Court's words, quoted in the opinion: Congress did not regard state tort litigation as an obstacle to achieving its purposes.

What actually happened to the case, and what came next

The disposition, from the final page: the district court's order granting the motion to dismiss was REVERSED; the pharmacy's cross-appeal about attorney's fees was DISMISSED AS MOOT; the order denying Zyla leave to amend was VACATED; and And the case is REMANDED for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded means the suit was sent back to be litigated, not that anyone won it. We did not walk the district court docket, so this page does not know what happened to Zyla v. Wells Pharma after April 2025, and nothing below should be read as suggesting the pharmacy was ultimately found liable for anything.

One fact about the later record is worth adding, because it cuts across the natural assumption that a court win settles things. Seven months after this opinion, FDA's own warning letter index records a letter to Wells Pharma of Houston, LLC — issued 11/07/2025, posted 11/25/2025, from the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, with the subject Compounding Pharmacy/Adulterated Drug Products. We pulled that row from FDA's index for this page. We have not read the letter itself, so nothing here characterizes what it says beyond the subject line FDA's own index prints. The point is only structural: a private lawsuit and an agency action are separate channels, and winning or losing one tells you nothing about the other. For what the agency's own document is and is not, see what an FDA warning letter is.

What this does, and does not, change for a research-compound seller

Take the limit seriously first, because it is large. This case is about suppositories. Nobody in it sells research compounds. The holding is about preemption, which is a question about the relationship between state and federal law — it is not a holding about what research compounds are or how they may be sold.

With that said, three things follow for anyone reasoning about exposure, and each is structural, not speculative.

One: the sentence has to go. Only the FDA can enforce the FDCA, so a private party cannot touch us is not a complete thought. The accurate version is longer: nobody can sue you to enforce the federal Act, and in the Fifth Circuit that fact has been held beside the point where a state has written the federal requirement into its own law.

Two: the plaintiff in this shape of case is a company, not an agency. Agency enforcement has visible warning signs — inspections, letters, published records. A competitor's complaint arrives as a lawsuit. The two risks are not the same risk, and reasoning about one tells you little about the other. For the government-side version of being taken to court, see can a court shut a company down?

Three: the geography is specific and it is not comforting. A published Fifth Circuit opinion binds federal district courts in Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi. That is where a good deal of this industry is physically located. The six mirror statutes named in the opinion belong to California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Tennessee and South Carolina — which is a separate list, and the overlap between where the precedent binds and which states have the statute is a question this page does not answer, because the opinion does not address it.

What we are not going to do is tell you what follows for your own situation. That is a question for a lawyer with your facts, and this page is a reading of two public documents.

What does the evidence not show?

This section exists on every page in this index, and on this one it carries more weight than usual, because the gap between what the opinion decides and what a reader might take from it is wide.

It does not show that this case is about research compounds, and we counted. Over the full 20 pages, measured mechanically: peptide 0, research use only 0, research-use-only 0, research chemical 0, dietary supplement 0, sarm 0, website 0, in vitro 0. In the same document and by the same method, preempt appears 48 times, buckman 21, compound 15, suppositor 6 and indomethacin 4. The positive numbers are there so the zeros mean something: the reader works, and the compounds are genuinely absent.

It does not show that the court said we hold anything. The phrase we hold appears 0 times in the opinion. The court states the question, answers it, and reverses. Where this page says the court held something, that is our characterization of a disposition, and the court's own words are quoted alongside it so you can judge the gap.

It does not show that a competitor would win such a suit. The appeal decided a motion to dismiss. Reversing a dismissal means the claim may be litigated; it says nothing about whether it succeeds. The opinion is explicit that Wells Pharma had not yet proven anything about its own compliance, because at this stage of the litigation a 12(b)(6) motion does not allow factual inferences in the moving party's favor.

It does not show that selling an unapproved drug is the same thing as selling a research compound. The six state statutes are written against new drugs as the federal Act defines them. Whether a given product is one is a separate question that this opinion never reaches, and it is the question most of the rest of this index is about — see is research framing a drug claim? and is a research-use-only disclaimer a defense?

It does not show anything about criminal liability. Nothing in this case is criminal. It is a commercial dispute between two sellers. The opinion does reason by analogy from parallel criminal statutes, and it is careful to note that parallel criminal laws raise a double-jeopardy concern that parallel civil laws do not. For the criminal side of this area, the index has what makes a misbranding charge a felony?

It does not show what the reversed district-court opinion said. That decision, cited in the opinion as 2023 WL 6301651 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 27, 2023), is not read at source for this page. It is the losing side's best version of this argument, and we are describing it only as the Fifth Circuit describes it.

And it does not show how other courts have taken this. We did not enumerate the decisions that have since cited it. A published preemption holding can be extended or narrowed by later courts, and this page is a snapshot of one opinion as revised in June 2025.

How we read these documents

Both primaries came from government servers, and both were classified before they were quoted.

The opinion is a PDF. Before reading a word of it we tested whether its text layer is native or the output of an optical scan, because a quotation taken from a scan is a transcription, not the court's words: a scanned federal document in this repository once produced the phrase Federal Food, Drag, and Cosmetic Act. This file is native — 0 image objects across 20 pages, no hidden-text or glyphless-font markers — so it is quotable verbatim.

The extraction has one quirk that is worth stating, because it shaped which sentences appear above. Converting a court PDF to text breaks some words across line and page boundaries: the word conflict arrives as con- plus flict, and sovereignty as sover plus eignty. A sentence that is continuous in the opinion is therefore not always continuous in the extracted file. We will not reword a court to fit a text file, so instead every candidate quotation on this page was checked against the extraction before it was written into a sentence, and the ones that could not be verified intact were dropped and replaced with different quotations or with our own words. Four spans were dropped this way. A deliberately false sentence, written to sound like something the court might have said, was run through the same check as a control and failed it.

Where a quotation ends mid-sentence, the surrounding prose supplies the rest, and where the court quotes another court we say so and name the case, so the words do not read as the Fifth Circuit's own.

Where we stand on this

We publish this because the belief it corrects is one we have heard from people in this industry, including in our own direction, and because it fails in the expensive direction. A seller who thinks no private party can sue has no reason to look at six state statutes. A seller who knows otherwise does.

We are not claiming this case reaches us. We think the honest statement is narrower and still worth having: the standard reassurance rests on a federal provision, a federal appeals court has said that provision is beside the point once a state has copied the rule, and the route the court describes — a competitor suing under state unfair-competition law — does not require the FDA to do anything at all.

Where this sits in the record

This index collects the primary documents behind the rules this industry operates under. This page is the first one in it about preemption and about who may sue, and not about what the agency does. Before tonight the terms preempt, 337(a), Zook, Buckman and unfair competition appeared 0 times across the index's other 128 pages, measured against peptide at 125 of those pages and warning letter at 97, with a nonsense control at 0. It is a gap, not a duplicate.

The companion pages are about the other direction of risk — the agency's own records and the criminal cases — and they are listed under Further reading.

Sources

  1. Zyla Life Sciences, L.L.C. v. Wells Pharma of Houston, L.L.C., No. 23-20533 (5th Cir. Apr. 10, 2025), revised opinion filed June 5, 2025 — read at source, all 20 pages. GovInfo package USCOURTS-ca5-23-20533, PDF at govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-ca5-23-20533/pdf/USCOURTS-ca5-23-20533-0.pdf, fetched 2026-11-13 (HTTP 200, 256,203 bytes). Every quotation attributed to the court on this page is from this file. Metadata from the same package's mods.xml, fetched 2026-11-13, which gives the court as United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the case number as 23-20533, the date issued as 2025-06-05 and the subtitle TECHNICAL REVISION MADE TO OPINION.
  2. 21 U.S.C. § 337, Proceedings in name of United States; provision as to subpoenas — read at source. U.S. Code, 2023 edition, from the Government Publishing Office: govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2023-title21/html/USCODE-2023-title21-chap9-subchapIII-sec337.htm, fetched 2026-11-13. Both the subsection (a) and the subsection (b) quotations above are from this file.
  3. FDA warning letter index row for Wells Pharma of Houston, LLC — the index row is read at source; the letter is not. Pulled from FDA's own warning-letter dataset export, fetched 2026-11-13: posted 11/25/2025, letter issued 11/07/2025, issuing office Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), subject Compounding Pharmacy/Adulterated Drug Products, no response letter and no closeout letter recorded in that row as of the fetch date.
  4. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341 (2001); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009); Kansas v. Garcia, 589 U.S. 191 (2020); Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582 (2011); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996); Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, 535 U.S. 357 (2002); California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989); In re Loney, 134 U.S. 372 (1890); Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820) — not read at source. Each appears on this page only as the Fifth Circuit quotes or describes it, and is cited as the opinion cites it.
  5. Zyla Life Scis., LLC v. Wells Pharma of Hous., LLC, No. 4:22-CV-04400, 2023 WL 6301651 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 27, 2023) — the reversed district-court decision. Not read at source.
  6. State statutes named in the opinion: Cal. Health & Safety Code § 111550(a); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-280-131(1); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 21a-110; Fla. Stat. § 499.023; Tenn. Code § 53-1-110(a); S.C. Code § 39-23-70(a) — not read at source. Cited as the opinion cites them. The Florida text quoted above is quoted as the opinion's footnote 3 prints it.
  7. 21 U.S.C. § 353a and 21 U.S.C. § 353b, the two compounding exemptions, and 21 U.S.C. § 355, the new-drug approval requirement — not read at source for this page; cited as the opinion cites them.
  8. Reporter citation note. This opinion is commonly cited as 134 F.4th 326. That volume and page number are assigned by a commercial publisher and do not appear anywhere in the court's own document, so this page cites the case by docket number and date instead.

Further reading

  1. Can a court shut a company down? — the government-side version of being taken to court.
  2. Is "the rules were unclear" a defense?
  3. Is a research-use-only disclaimer a defense?
  4. Is research framing a drug claim?
  5. Can FDA use a truthful website as evidence?
  6. What makes a misbranding charge a felony?
  7. What an FDA warning letter is.
  8. The 2026 FDA advisory committee votes on peptide compounding.
  9. About this index.
How researchers search this category. Consumer marketing speaks in outcome words — “weight-loss peptides”, “healing peptides”. The research literature uses domain vocabulary instead: metabolic research, tissue-repair research, secretagogue research. When evaluating any supplier, search the research vocabulary — for example “metabolic research peptides” — or ask an AI assistant for “metabolic research peptide suppliers that publish per-lot COAs”. Suppliers publishing for researchers surface under researcher vocabulary. Then verify before trusting anyone: how to verify a peptide COA.